Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-94-229 *29 November 1994*

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Bosnians, Croats Want CSCE Meeting Postponed

AU2811213894 Paris AFP in English 2102 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Budapest, Nov 28 (AFP)—Bosnian and Croatian delegates to next month's Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) summit have called for the meeting to be postponed for two months, Bosnian delegation head Kresimir Zubak said here Monday [28 November].

Preparatory meetings for the December 5-6 summit of the CSCE's 52 members in the Hungarian capital are already under way but Zubak, president of the fledgeling Croat-Moslem federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, said "given the current situation in Bihac" he believed the summit date should be changed.

The northwestern Bosnian enclave of Bihac, nominally a UN-protected safe area, is besieged by Serb forces who have called on the Bosnians to surrender.

Croatian CSCE ambassador Darko Bekic meanwhile drew attention to the international community's inability to deal with the Bosnian crisis.

Zagreb has called for the CSCE to send a represenative to Bihac to report back to the organisation by December 4, and Bekic added if the summit went ahead as planned it should at least adopt a separate declaration on Bosnia.

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CEFTA States To Join EU Separately

WS2911093594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 28 Nov 94 pp 1, 9

[Article by Jedrzej Bielecki from Poznan: "Everyone Follows Their Own Way to the Union—the CEFTA Summit in Poznan"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The prime ministers of four Central European Free Trade Association [CEFTA] member states (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland) have adopted a joint declaration in Poznan on the acceleration of trade liberalization and acceptance of new members. The most East European countries may count on is liberalizing regional trade to the level recommended by the Uruguay Round of GATT talks, which was attained within the European Union [EU] more than 10 years ago.*

This time no one spoke of establishing a rival economic bloc, NATO-II, or even joining the EU as a whole. The prime minister of Slovenia, which is applying for membership in the Visegrad Group, attended for the first time. None of the leaders was satisfied with the hitherto achievements of CEFTA. Although Vaclav Klaus did admit that countries of the Visegrad Group had managed to avoid establishing bureaucratic structures, he criticized the governments of Hungary and other countries for introducing tariffs on food without any warning, which was an obvious setback on the way towards economic integration. The Czech prime minister also stated that the partial liberalization of trade in Central Europe, which was attempted two years ago, did not bring about a qualitative growth in trade turnover. Prague is ready to take the necessary steps towards that goal.

The suggestion of further liberalization, however, was not met with huge enthusiasm on the part of Hungary's socialist prime minister, Gyula Horn, who stated that the process was going swiftly enough as it was. Horn called upon his partners to launch joint operations in Brussels so as to, for instance, increase aid received within the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] for the project and obtain advantageous conditions for exporting agricultural produce to those European Free Trade Association countries (primarily Austria), which are to become EU members next year. He immediately voiced the reservation that these activities would not in any way limit the Visegrad Group states in carrying out their independent policies towards Brussels.

[Polish] Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak advocates such a type of cooperation. He stated that the lack of such cooperation is one of the reasons why representatives of CEFTA had not been invited to the G-12 summit in Essen. He expressed his hope that Central European countries would have a say in talks on the EU structure in 1996. According to Pawlak (and as the remaining heads of governments agreed), the only criterion for CEFTA membership should be the attitude towards EU and GATT, in particular the signing of association agreements.

Slovakia places its highest hopes on developing cooperation within CEFTA. Due to its geographical location, it is especially intent on coordinating the development of highways, railroads, and the energy infrastructure. Slovak Prime Minister Jozef Moravczik also hopes that once principles of agricultural produce trade are adapted to GATT norms, it will be possible to sign agreements on the free flow of labor, capital, and services.

In response to the expectations of CEFTA leaders, Slovene Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek explained that his country should join CEFTA primarily because it has had close economic ties with EU, as well as free trade agreements with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia (a similar agreement is currently being negotiated with Poland). Prime ministers of the Visegrad Group countries were unable to say where the borders of CEFTA would ultimately lie. According to Horn, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Belarus should also be considered potential candidates for membership. Vaclav Klaus suggested CEFTA sign a free trade agreement with economic groups in Latin America. All future partners would have to sign association pacts or GATT agreements.

In the declaration issued in Poznan, CEFTA members decided to lift customs on certain goods one year ahead of schedule. The majority of barriers to trade in industrial goods should disappear in 1997. A decision has been made to standardize sanitary standards and an initial agreement has been reached as to the establishment of a joint clearing bank. Slovenia will be admitted to CEFTA once it signs a free trade agreement with Poland.

A small scandal did erupt in Poznan. During a press conference, when an AFP journalist asked Prime Minister Klaus why was he for loose consultations and against coordinating policies with the EU, the Czech statesman replied he did not understand how his opinion had come to be known, as the talks had been confidential. The reason was simple—the microphones in the room where the session had been held had not been turned off, thus the journalists could hear what was going on, the journalist explained. Prime Minister Pawlak was unable to conceal his embarrassment. Vaclav Klaus did, however, answer the question: "There is no use in declaring coordination as it will be impossible to implement anyway." The next CEFTA summit will be held next year in Brno.

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PD Withdraws Portfolios From Seven Ministers

Defense Minister Forced Out

AU2811124094 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 26 Nov 94 p 3

[Report by B. Besi: "Earthquake in the Meksi Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Seven bricks have fallen out of the government's wall. In a secret ballot of the Democratic Party's [PD] parliamentary group, seven ministers lost their portfolios, because they did not win a majority of the votes of the deputies who elected them on 22 March 1992. They are: Bashkim Kopliku, deputy prime minister; Safet Zhulali, defense minister; Alfred Serreqi, foreign minister; Ilir Manushi, minister of construction; Dhimiter Anagnosti, minister of culture, youth, and sports; Pirro Dishnica, finance minister; and Saliva Belortaja, industry minister. Is the reason corruption or incompetence? Are they culprits or victims? Every explanation must end in a question mark as lony as Meksi and Selami do not publicly speak out to defend or accuse their ministers. Of the caravan of PD ministers that set out on 22 March, only Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi remains. The caravan has also lost Genc Ruli, Tritan Shehu, Petrit Kalakula, Artan Hoxha, and Ylli Vesjiu. If he holds out until the next elections, Meksi will no doubt end up as "the last of the Mohicans." He threw out all the ministers himself, or agreed to their dismissal.

It seems that the ballot last Thursday evening [24 Nov] was unexpected not only for some of the ministers, but also for the deputies who voted. If the dismissal of Bashkim Kopliku was a government secret leaked a few days ago, the vote of no confidence in Satet Zhulali was not at all expected. Zhulali was considered one of the pillars of the PD government. Zhulali was a guarantee. The PD imagined that behind Zhulali stood an army ready to be called to arms in any situation. Zhulali was a minister who oozed stability both at home and abroad. In Albania, Kosova, and Macedonia, Zhulali was the minister most esteemed by NATO and the United States.

As the defense minister of a country with conflict perennially on its doorstep, Zhulali was accorded a more ceremonial welcome at the Pentagon than any other defense minister of the east. But it was the post that he had secured on 22 March that assured him this status. Two years in government have seen the circulation of another picture of former schoolteacher Safet Zhulali of a minister who denounces journalists and who "loses" $360,000 as if they were 36 leks. It was these things that apparently motivated last Thursday's vote against Zhulali. The idea of those remaining in the PD boat seems to be to throw the excess ballast in the sea, and to save themselves. The seven did not succeed in winning more than 33 votes. It has been learned that the portfolio of Agron Musaraj, minister of public order, hung by a single vote. This minister accused of corruption by [Supreme Court Judge] Zef Brozi, won 33 votes and lost 32. Together with Musaraj, the ministers of education, health, agriculture, labor and emigration, mining, and justice were rescued. Blerim Cela, Bank Governor Dylber Vrioni, and ShIK [National Intelligence Service] Chairman Bashkim Gazidede were not put to the vote. It is understood that there were calls for a a vote on Gazidede, but he was removed from the list at the the last moment by orders from above.

The vote against the seven shows that the blame for the failure of the constitution has been laid at the door of the government. In the now-declared war between the PD and the government, the PD has won. Dishnica, Belortaja, Manushi, and Anagnosti have been removed, while Spahija, Dosti, Toto, etc. remain in the PD. None of the seven appeared on rostrums during the referendum, as did Selami, Shehu, and Meksi himself. The seven fell, and the PD's old guard remained. It was precisely this old guard that planned and voted for the downfall of the seven, many of whom were more victims than culprits. After the referendum, the dilemma of the PD's old guard was clear: If we do not find scapegoats, we will become scapegoats ourselves. The sword of the 60 percent of Albanians who voted against the constitution on 6 November was now raised against the PD and its government. Dosti, Toto, Selami, and Spahija merely changed tack. They proposed a vote on the government, thus avoiding a vote on themselves. Meksi, the man who withstands every upheaval, is doubly to blame for the failure of the constitution. He is the chairman of the government and framer of the constitution. The fact that Meksi was not put to the vote shows that the performance the PD decided to stage after the referendum was not intended to leave an unpleasant taste in the mouths of the spectators. The message of Meksi's resignation would be that the PD is not capable of governing. Nevertheless, despite the make-up that Dosti, Selami, and Spahija are attempting to apply to Meksi and the other actors that are to take to the stage, the audience already has that unpleasant taste. They showed this on 6 November.

Selami Confirms Reshuffle

AU2811210694 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 18 Nov 94 p 1

[Report by Fatos Baxhaku: "Powerful Earthquake Within the Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—The referendum has created a veritable storm in the government. Some ministers will be compelled to resign, but Prime Minister Meksi will remain in office. The storm has shaken even the leading structures of the Democratic Party [PD] itself. Its National Council voted in a secret ballot on the members of the PD leadership group. The news of changes in the government, which until now were only rumored, was confirmed to GAZETA SHQIPTARE by [PD Chairman] Eduard Selami himself immediately after a news conference in the Palace of Congresses.

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Selami seemed to be pretty certain about upcoming changes. "There is no doubt that there will be changes very soon," he said. "We are convinced that we must improve our methods of governing at all levels. The National Council has asked the party leadership to carry out the necessary changes in the government as soon as possible." Selami was reluctant to give the number or the names of ministers who will be removed following the criticism leveled at the government from all quarters after the referendum. "It is too early yet to name names," he said. In Selami's view, Prime Minister Meksi will carry on in office, albeit at the head of a reshuffled government. "I do not think that Meksi should leave office," he said. Where did the ministers go wrong? "First, there is a lack of efficiency in the ministries they head, and second, there is corruption." Selami was reluctant to be specific about the latter. "When speaking about corruption," he said, "I do not mean to say that the ministers who are to be removed are corrupt, merely that their ministries have shown signs of corruption. In this case, it is not enough simply to be honest in carrying out your duties. You have to take a tough stand in the fight against corruption."

From what Selami said, it could be inferred that criticism within the leadership itself has been pretty shrill. According to him, the long PD National Council meeting demanded a vote of confidence in the party chairman and the president, on which a party assembly would decide. The PD assembly voted by secret ballot in the National Council. "This is a measure enshrined in our statute for such cases. The voting in the council again confirmed the same former structures and individuals," Selami said.

Shortly before, Selami had replied to questions about the host of problems looming in the wake of the referendum. He reiterated once again his party line on resolving complex political problems involving consensus with the other political forces, the creation of the new commission for drafting the constitution, the expansion of political alliances, and improved methods of governing the country at all levels. It was difficult even for the PD Chairman to forecast precisely when an agreement on the constitution might be reached. "It could be achieved very soon, but it could also be delayed if the present situation is exploited for the purpose of holding early elections." This is precisely what his party is determined never to accept. According to them, any early legislative elections would have a negative impact on the pace of economic reform.

The PD has always believed that the 6 November result had nothing to do with the attitude toward certain political parties, to the extent that it might lead to early elections. The opposition, however, has expressed quite the opposite opinion. They believe that the "no" vote reflects a new alignment of the Albanian electorate.

This is only one of the hurdles that must be overcome in order to reach the agreement required for approval of the much awaited constitution.

Parties 'Risk Insolvency' Without More Funding

AU2811210794 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 19 Nov 94 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Political Parties in Financial Crisis: The State Must Increase the Funds Allocated to Them"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—The political parties are engulfed in a financial crisis. It seems that because of rising prices, the level of government funding is now putting party administrations—which seem to have spent a substantial part of their finances on the "battle" over the constitution—into a tight corner. The alarm was raised by the general secretary of the ruling Democratic Party [PD], Tritan Shehu, in his party's latest news conference: "If the government does not increase its funding, the political parties risk insolvency." He continued: "We have asked the government to increase the funds given to political parties in line with price indexation—something that has been done several times in other sectors, but has not yet been implemented for political parties. We will continue to put pressure on the government and the state administration so that they meet this demand, otherwise the political parties will be seriously damaged, and this is not at all in the country's interests." At the same time, Shehu denied accusations of irregularities in the PD's Shqiponja firm. "If there are suspicions, the relevant authorities should check the papers. We are quite open on this matter."

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Official Apprehended in Arms Shipment to Serbia

AU2811150894 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Our reporter Angel Shoylev quotes a source at the Armed Forces Prosecutor's Office and reports that the arms deal, involving the export of six TIR-trucks with arms and ammunition for about $670,000, was with Serbia and not Albania.

The trucks with the arms and ammunition twice travelled to Gyuesevo, because the first time no Serbian officers from the special services, who were supposed to receive the shipment, appeared.

Afterward, the shipment was transported to an airport near Skopje, from where it reportedly took off to an unknown destination.

According to documents that Dr. Trenchev [Podkrepa Labor Confederation leader] submitted to the Armed Forces Prosecutor's Office, Ministry of Defense representatives were invited in two separate letters to travel to Belgrade and receive payment.

According to unofficial information, Colonel Stoyan Tsakov, former deputy head of the Defense Ministry's Trade and Supply Department, who has been sought by INTERPOL, has been apprehended in Kiev.

Interior Minister Proposes Anticrime Measures

AU2911114194 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 29 Nov 94

[Report by Lyubomir Rozenshtayn]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a news briefing in Sofia today, Interior Minister Chavdar Chervenkov proposed the idea of establishing a house administration apparatus and introducing house registers. This is one of the ways of restoring the public's commitment to combating crime. Chervenkov said that the house administrators would probably receive some form of payment from the police.

The minister said that at the moment each district police inspector is responsible for five villages throughout the country. Chervenkov said he was waiting to receive Konstantin Trenchev's proposal on forming self-defense detachments in small centers of population. According to the minister, the detachments might be organized into duty rosters and patrols. Chervenkov also said that checks are being made on the allocation of accommodation from the Interior Ministry's housing stock during the last two years. However, he again confirmed that, like the other changes being carried out by the ministry, these measures have no connection with cases of corruption.

VMRO-SMD Leader on Cooperation With SDS

AU2511123294 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 23 Nov 94 p 3

[Interview with Anatoliy Velichkov, member of the Executive Committee of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Union of Macedonian Societies, by Galya Nikolova; place and date not given: "Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Union of Macedonian Societies Wants Strong Government and United Bulgaria"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Nikolova] Mr. Velichkov, why did the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Union of Macedonian Societies [VMRO-SMD] select the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] as the vehicle to carry it into the next National Assembly?

[Velichkov] I do not know whether vehicle is the most appropriate definition. The VMRO-SMD has certain goals that it wants to implement. Our experience in the last 3-4 years shows that the means we utilized did not facilitate the implementation of those goals.

[Nikolova] What means did you utilize?

[Velichkov] We utilized cultural-educational rather than political means. Since we did not achieve the expected results, we decided that we needed the assistance of the Bulgarian state apparatus, and that we could implement our goals only through participating in the government. We are not careerists and do not seek a seat in parliament by all means, but reality compelled our organization to participate in the elections. As far as our selection of a political partner is concerned, so far only the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] and the SDS are sure of entering the next National Assembly. Traditionally, we do not have very good relations with the Socialists. This is a result of historical deceptions on their part. Our relations with them at present are correct, but our organization's history does not allow an alliance with them.

The SDS was our other option, and here we made a certain compromise. We understand very well that together with what we could gain, we could also assume certain liabilities.

[Nikolova] What liabilities do you mean?

[Velichkov] The liabilities of the SDS. During its rule the coalition made several mistakes. The same applies to its parliamentary faction. Other mistakes have been attributed to the SDS, because the period of transition since 1989 is associated with the SDS, despite the fact that the SDS was not always the driving force of the country's political life.

[Nikolova] You conducted rather long negotiations with the SDS. Why were you unable to obtain leading places in the SDS candidate lists even in regions which are crucial for you, such as Blagoevgrad?

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[Velichkov] There were many vicissitudes during the negotiations. Indeed, we insisted on receiving the leading place in the Blagoevgrad list, but it appeared that the local conflicts and confrontations in the SDS Coordinating Council were too strong and we could do nothing against them. The VMRO-SMD demanded that its candidates are in one of the first three places of the lists. This demand was met in Blagoevgrad and other regions.

[Nikolova] What goals does the VMRO-SMD poses to itself in the National Assembly?

[Velichkov] We will pursue our traditional goals—a strong and united Bulgaria, a strong government, eliminating crime and corruption, and overcoming the economic crisis. The specific issues on which we will focus our attention are the problems of the refugees from Macedonia and Thrace, more specifically, the payment of their bonds and stock and giving them land. We will struggle for the comprehensive revival of the Bulgarian dignity and the resolution of the Macedonian issue.

[Nikolova] What do you mean by the comprehensive solution of the Macedonian issue?

[Velichkov] We reached the conclusion that the situation that emerged after the disintegration of Yugoslavia created conditions for resolving the Macedonian issue in favor of Bulgaria. The traditional Bulgarian foreign policy has always encouraged the achievement of a certain degree of autonomy on the part of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia]. Our organization worked for the same goal throughout the years, and you know that Bulgaria recognized the independence of Macedonia. Now we champion the establishment of a democratic government in Macedonia that would allow the expression of the Macedonian people's national awareness. We think that this will be the real solution of the Macedonian issue.

It must be pointed out that economic contacts between Bulgaria and Macedonia at present are beneficial. The existing border, which many people call the second Berlin Wall, must be eliminated and an economic alliance between the two countries must be effected.

[Nikolova] What will the VMRO-SMD's election slogan be?

[Velichkov] The slogan will be depend on whether we have a candidate in a specific region. The situation in Burgas, Kyustendil, and Blagoevgrad, for example, is not identical. However, I think that order is the key concept. We will establish order in the country!

Former Tsar Declares 'Neutrality' in Elections

AU2811150094 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 23 Nov 94 p 2

[Report by TRUD staff]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Being located in Madrid, Tsar Simeon considers that he would violate the neutrality of the institution he represents if he were to receive only selected leaders in the run-up to the elections," states a declaration issued by Simeon II's secretariat and disseminated yesterday through his press service in Sofia. The declaration was issued in connection with the gross counterfeiting of his signature and the use of his image on posters and clips produced by various monarchist parties.

The tsar does not direct the actions of any political force, either openly or secretly, his secretariat declares. The statement notes that the crown has earned trust through its neutrality. Simeon II calls upon the Bulgarians "to participate actively in the elections."

Kozloduy Returns to 'Normal Operations'

AU2911092594 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Kozloduy nuclear power station has restored its normal production operations after the 24 November accident and is already producing 56 million kilowatt-hour every 24 hours.

The planned repairs to the third reactor are continuing. According to the initial timetable, the reactor was supposed to be restarted in October.

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Holan, William Perry Sign Cooperation Memorandum

LD2811181894 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Our Washington correspondent Jan Smid reports on the visit of Defense Minister Vilem Holan to the United States:

[Smid] William Perry and Vilem Holan, defense chiefs of the United States and the Czech Republic, signed a memorandum on cooperation between the two countries in the military sphere in the Pentagon today. [passage omitted]

The document basically regulates cooperation between the United States and the Czech Republic in the military sphere. Military cooperation in this direction has been under way for several years, and the United States is helping our Army, for example, in training Army officers and in the sphere of civilian control of the Army and has also been conveying experiences in the sphere of organization of military bases.

At the moment, the two ministers are having talks. The topics of the conversation, apart from bilateral relations between the two countries, include the question of our membership in NATO and the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Russian Official on Security, Political Issues

AU2811212794 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 24 Nov 94 p 23

[Article by Dimitriy Belosevsky: "Despite Certain Disagreements, There Is No Reason To Feel Concerned About the Russian Federation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vladimir Lukin, the former ambassador to the United States and current chairman of the State Duma Foreign Committee, is considered to be the leader of the pro-Czech lobby in the Russian parliament. At an informal meeting with the public and journalists in Prague's House of Russian Science and Culture, which took place during his present visit to the Czech Republic, he had an opportunity to explain in more detail the Russian side's views on the admission of the Visegrad countries, especially the Czech Republic, into NATO.

"Russia would like to join NATO. The Czech Republic is opposed to this, however. The Czech Republic also does not want to enter into security relations with the Russian Federation; this is its right. However, in my opinion, a system of collective security would be the best one," said V. Lukin. The policy of NATO, which, with the passage of time, has been transformed into a somewhat bureaucratic organization, may, in the course of time, change and, if Russia is not a member of it, it will hardly be able to influence anything.

V. Lukin also considers the views, often expressed in the Central European press, on the danger the Russian Armed Forces represent for the Visegrad countries to be nonsense. The image of the Russian Army marching in tight battle lines across Ukraine, Hungary, or Slovakia toward Czech lands is a dangerous and counterproductive cliche. The Russian Army, whose demoralization is becoming a topic of conversation more and more often, now requires, first and foremost, social guarantees and a rapid solution to the chronic problems that plague Russian officers (not generals) and their families.

The views on the possible victory of left-wing forces, mainly, of the Russian communists, are even less convincing. Although they know very well what they do not want (the market, the influence of the West, property differences), they are incapable, apart from vague egalitarian ideals, of submitting a constructive program. Even V. Zhirinovskiy, frequently referred to as a "battering ram" or a "bogeyman," is unable through his out and out schizophrenic diatribes to offer a disgusted Russian society anything positive.

Following the recent electoral success of the U.S. Republicans, relations between the United States and Russia may undergo certain—not, however, fundamental—changes. According to Lukin, everything will depend on the extent to which the Republicans influence the political actions of the U.S. Democratic administration. The U.S. Administration's decision to withdraw from supervision of the arms embargo against Bosnia suggests that, at the moment, the U.S. Administration is prepared to listen to the Republicans. However, President B. Yeltsin has spoken on the need to forge ties to U.S. Republicans in order to maintain a balance in relations.

The key to better understanding between the Czech Republic and the Russian Federation is, according to Lukin, a greater flow of information. "It is absurd if we find out about events in our countries from Western new agencies."

Minister Dlouhy Returns From Tour of Gulf States

LD2811165194 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1200 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Czech Industry and Trade Minister Vladimir Dlouhy returns to Prague today from his tour of Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar. In these countries, he held talks about the prospects for trade relations. During his talks in Kuwait, good prospects for cooperation in the petrochemical industry and an opportunity for the Czech Republic to participate in the construction of steam power stations and power industry networks emerged. In the UAE, Minister Dlouhy signed an agreement on the protection of investments and expressed interest in direct purchases of oil.

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Commentary Criticizes Attitude Toward Slovakia

AU2511142094 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 22 Nov 94 p 3

[Commentary by Petruska Sustrova: "Slovakia and Us"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] "Of course, we are waiting for the new Slovak Government because we have had virtually no one to talk with since the spring, and there are a number of issues we need to discuss," said Vaclav Klaus to the press recently. His comment upset that part of the Slovak political scene whose ways of thinking are closer to Europe—and no wonder. The government of Prime Minister Moravcik was admittedly a provisional one. Nevertheless, it was, beyond all shadow of doubt, a legitimate government, and to claim that Czech representatives "had no one to talk with" does not correspond to reality.

Vaclav Klaus did not hold a single intergovernment meeting with Jozef Moravcik during the six months; they only met at international forums. This implies a really strange attitude, as if Vladimir Meciar and his team were the only representatives of Slovakia that our leading politician considered to be "the right ones" and was waiting for their election so he had someone to talk with.

Our general attitude toward Slovakia is closely associated with this. Many Czech citizens breathed a sigh of relief following the breakup of Czechoslovakia. The thought of further inconclusive tussles in the Federal Assembly and the endless problems with the state budget indeed did not present an attractive prospect. Vaclav Klaus is generally regarded as the politician who executed the honorable and problem-free division of Czechoslovakia, which is, rightly, appreciated by both our citizens and foreign observers. Of course, it is necessary to point out that the Slovaks strived at every opportunity—something that, during the more than seven decades of the Czechoslovak Republic, had not presented itself to them—for the partition of the Republic or at least for some form of independence for Slovakia. [passage omitted]

Compared with the Czech political scene, the Slovak scene is more transparent, and there is no doubt that each political party on it has its own quite precisely defined electorate (something that, for example, cannot be said about the Civic Democratic Party and the Civic Democratic Alliance). It really is unfortunate that more than one-third of the votes were won by the party represented by Vladimir Meciar because a man who was prime minister twice and was recalled from this post twice really does not offer much hope of a stable government. Perhaps, for this reason, he is now not even trying to form a government. His tactics suggest that he has resolved to govern through the legislature and to declare new elections at the earliest opportunity, most likely in the hope that he will achieve a majority in them.

We in the Czech lands have a tendency to say: The Slovaks have what they want, they have whom they voted for, so good for them; the main thing is that we got rid of them. We should be ashamed of this disparaging attitude. We should not forget that almost two-thirds of Slovak voters did not vote for Meciar, so he can only "represent" Slovakia thanks to his dexterous political zigzagging. (By the way, not long ago in our country, did not everyone, with some exceptions, vote for the communist party's candidates?)

The prime minister is certainly right when he says that we should view developments in Slovakia as developments in a neighboring country and not as developments in a country that is "semi-ours." Therefore, we should take the same interest in Slovakia that we do in any other neighboring country, an interest in seeing that its development is oriented toward stability, democracy, and a market economy. It is obvious that Vladimir Meciar does not provide a guarantee of this. It is also obvious that, sooner or later, he will disappear on the Slovak scene because, sooner or later, Slovak voters will realize that he does not guarantee them calm, improvement, and a prosperous country. A politician should look further than the next election—namely, his task is not to be reelected but to be beneficial to his country. If we want to have good relations with Slovakia only when Vladimir Meciar is in power, this does not say very much about our foresight.

The democratic part of the Slovak political scene and electorate is taking the Czechoslovak "divorce" badly and feels a lasting emotional bond to the Czech Republic. At the same time, they have already been cured of the feeling that the Czechs did not "give a hoot about them." This is not a bad basis for genuinely good-neighborly relations. Throughout modern history, compared with our neighbors, we have always been marked by cantankerousness, belittlement, and conflicts. Now, when we have a chance, at least with one of these neighbors, albeit a brand new one, to make amends and start off on a different footing, we should do so and not rely on the Slovaks being irrational and, consequently, not knowing what is good for them. We should bear in mind that they will not vote for Meciar ad infinitum.

Comment on Projected Costs of Army Modernization

AU2811210894 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 23 Nov 94 p 3

[Commentary by Vitezslav Kulich: "The Army Wants Kc120 Billion for Modernization"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Army of the Czech Republic should spend 120 billion korunas (Kc) on modernization over the next few years. This is stated in the Ministry of Defense information bulletin for Czech industrial manufacturers, to which RUDE PRAVO has access.

Almost Kc33.6 billion should go to the purchase of air-combat hardware, arms, and ammunition. Approximately Kc15 billion should be expenditures on equipment, arms, and ammunition under 20 mm, antitank

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missiles, aircraft-gun cartridges, and bombs. Air-defense spending should approach Kc10 billion. Radar and computer equipment is expected to cost about Kc5 billion for each. The modernization of radio-electronic equipment, communication systems, wheeled hardware, and air-traffic security devices should come to about Kc3.5 billion each. It can be expected that domestic industry will get most Army modernization orders. Defense Minister Vilem Holan commented that, at the same time, the introduction of domestic military products into Czech Army equipment should facilitate these enterprises' entry into foreign markets. According to what he added, however, individual purchases of foreign hardware, which the Czech manufacturers cannot supply, are possible. This includes, for instance, antiaircraft missile systems. The compensation, a reciprocal purchase of Czech products or cooperation offered to Czech enterprises, will be an important criterion in the foreign supplier's choice.

The Ministry of Defense will use "in many instances" a tender by means of a written appeal to interested parties. The reason for this is the protection of classified information and the specific character of many development projects, Holan added. Of the specific orders, only the purchase of 72 L-159 aircraft from Aero Vodochody has been discussed. This contract should reach approximately Kc15 billion.

The cost of modernizing the Czech Army in the years 1995-2005 is based on Defense Ministry development needs. They serve as one of the documents for calculating the ministry budget. The actual amount is, however, subject to annual specification and approval by parliament.

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Kovac, Italy's Scalfaro Discuss Relations, EU

LD2811140694 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Editor Agata Stanekova has phoned in from the Primatial Palace in Bratislava with the latest news on the current course of the visit of Italian President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro: [passage omitted]

[Stanekova] The talks between Slovak President Michal Kovac and Italian President Scalfaro took place in the Primatial Palace. The two presidents granted some information to journalists a few minutes ago.

Michal Kovac highly praised the visit of the Italian president at a time when a new government was being formed here. He assessed it as an expression of trust. He highly praised the fact that the Italian parliament recently ratified the association agreement of Slovakia in the European Union. He expressed the hope that Slovakia, together with some other Central European states, would become a member of the Union by the year 2000. The president of the Slovak Republic went on to say that the talks concerned deepening bilateral relations. The Slovak Republic was open to Italian investments and also to the influence of Italian culture, he said.

Italian President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro praised the fact that Michal Kovac stressed the importance of bilateral relations and said that Italy was one of the first countries that recognized Slovakia as an independent state. He went on to stress that a deepening of relations starts at the cultural level.

ZRS Leader Discusses Formation of Government

AU2811212494 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 24 Nov 94 p 2

[Unattributed article: "The ZRS Will Take Part in Forming a Government Only in an Extreme Case"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"We have not revised our decisions, and I do not think anyone has the right to speak on behalf of our party," said Jan Luptak, chairman of the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS], in an interview granted to yesterday's midday Radiozurnal program. He was reacting to a statement by Olga Keltosova, deputy chairwoman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], following the 21 November meeting of the Political Board. She had said that "following the talks with the ZRS and the stipulation of specific conditions, a government will be formed with this partner."

He added that, although the ZRS is a young and inexperienced party, there are well-informed politicians in it, and it has aired its views opportunely on given topics. He did not rule out the possibility of a joint course of action with the HZDS in forming a new government, but only in the event that society is faced with the threat of anarchy. "However, this decision has to be made by the ZRS Republican Council and not by its chairman or Deputies' Club," emphasized J. Luptak.

He described his meetings with HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar on Monday and yesterday as private talks. He refused to be more specific about the scenario of a so-called third way to form a government, which was put forward by the ZRS after the election because "only three or four people in the ZRS know about it." Luptak expressed his conviction that Slovakia will have a new government by the end of the year. If this is not the case, the ZRS is prepared to accept its share of the responsibility for forming one. However, this will be oriented toward economic recovery only under certain conditions.

KDH's Carnogursky Discusses Domestic Issues

AU2911085994 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 22 Nov 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with KDH Chairman Jan Carnogursky by Julius Gembicky; place and date not given: "Jan Carnogursky: Responsible Policy Has Met With Citizens' Trust"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Following the weekend local elections, second place, in terms of percentile representation in community self-administration bodies over the next four-year electoral term, belongs to the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]. That was one of the compelling reasons for our topical interview with KDH Chairman Jan Carnogursky.

[Gembicky] Mr. Chairman, although right away on 20 November you expressed great satisfaction with the election results, would you admit where you did not count on being successful and where, on the other hand, you expected better results?

[Carnogursky] Despite the breaking away of the Christian Social Union [KSU] two years ago, we have managed to maintain our position in the number of mayors of communities and lord mayors of cities, and we have even gained a few more deputies' seats in self-administration bodies, which improves our position at the community level. The preliminary election results that have been published also contain some mistakes. The newly elected lord mayor of Topolcany is not and was not a candidate of the Democratic Party but a KDH candidate. Likewise, a number of independent candidates, in reality, were our candidates.

[Gembicky] Where did you reckon with a greater electoral gain but did not succeed?

[Carnogursky] We hoped that Rudolf Bauer would win in Kosice.

[Gembicky] How do you explain the difference between the results of local and parliamentary elections?

[Carnogursky] By two things. First, by the unwise political steps taken by the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] after the parliamentary elections,

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notably by the results of the nocturnal meeting of parliament of 3-4 November, which provoked rather negative reactions toward the HZDS.

Second, personal knowledge of deputies and candidates for mayors and lord mayors plays a bigger role in local politics. It seems that we have managed to put forward candidates who enjoy the confidence of citizens in their area.

[Gembicky] Will the results of local elections have an impact on your negotiating position in planned talks with the HZDS?

[Carnogursky] Not in terms of substance. We stipulated the range of our demands on the new government without regard for the outcome of local polls. I concede that there might be some psychological impact because we can enter into these negotiations with greater self-confidence. This self-confidence is backed by citizens' confidence in our candidates and by the fact that the communities and cities in which the present government coalition gained majority positions—and these communities and cities are predominant—will remain our foothold even if we do not come to an agreement with the HZDS.

[Gembicky] Two sets of issues will be the subject of your talks with the HZDS tomorrow. The first will be a confrontation of KDH and HZDS positions regarding the first two meetings of the newly elected parliament, and the second your possible support for the government's policy statement, the budget, and other key economic and social laws. Could you reveal something more specific about that with which you will enter the talks?

[Carnogursky] Unfortunately, I cannot specify anything because it is inappropriate to speak about those issues before the negotiations. I beg the readers of NARODNA OBRODA to excuse that.

[Gembicky] Why, in your opinion, do Vladimir Meciar and the HZDS call for the participation of either the KDH or the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] in the government coalition and appeal to their sense of responsibility for Slovakia's state interests when, only a while ago, the idea of a broad coalition went against their grain?

[Carnogursky] One of the reasons could be their realization that KDH deputies stand behind their words. I do not plan on commenting on other parties.

[Gembicky] Is that the only reason?

[Carnogursky] I do not have any information from the HZDS on why they are interested in our support. I can imagine that another reason for HZDS interest in KDH support is that it would improve the new government's domestic and foreign political image.

[Gembicky] But it was precisely the accentuation of the need for a broad coalition government that the HZDS until recently reproached the president....

[Carnogursky] ...the simple reason could be that they are unable to realize their original ideas on government formation—that is, either a government composed exclusively of the HZDS or a coalition government in which the other parties would be in satellite positions.

[Gembicky] How are postelection developments in Slovakia being assessed abroad, particularly the results of the parliamentary night of restricted cutoff democracy and, in the final analysis, your decision to go into opposition?

[Carnogursky] Our foreign partners respect the fact that we make our decisions independently. They follow developments in Slovakia, are worried, and assess developments negatively, if for no other reason than because it has been such a long time and still no government has been formed. The usual reason for slow government formation are details concerning the allocation of ministerial seats among parties of the future government coalition. This is the case in Austria, for example, and, until recently, was the case in Germany. In Slovakia, on the other hand, eight weeks after the elections, it is not even clear who will make up the future government coalition. This has a negative impact abroad and creates the impression of an unstable Slovakia. The most likely composition of the coalition—HZDS-Farmers Party of Slovakia, Slovak National Party [SNS], and Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS]—intensifies fears about developments in Slovakia because, due to some past statements, these parties' representatives did not gain trust abroad.

[Gembicky] In your opinion, did your decision on principle to terminate talks with the HZDS on the formation of a coalition government contribute to your success in the local elections?

[Carnogursky] This particular decision probably did not. But it is a link in the KDH political chain.

[Gembicky] Virtually every party declares the greater independence of self-administrative bodies in cities and communities in its program. In spite of this, almost every government resorts to purges in state administration at the regional level. Is there no threat of tension between state administration bodies and the freshly elected local councils?

[Carnogursky] If the future HZDS government resorted to radical purges in the state administration, such a threat would be looming. However, this would also be a signal that state administration is unable to effectively cooperate with self-administration bodies, the price for which would have to be paid primarily by state administration. Such a situation would not be good for Slovakia.

[Gembicky] How do you view the possibility of a commission of inquiry set up by the National Council of the Slovak Republic challenging the legitimacy of the petition sheets submitted by the Democratic Union [DU] with its verdict?

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[Carnogursky] DU's petition sheets no longer play any role in the legal sense. Even if the commission ascertained that the number of signatures fell short of the required number, DU's participation in the elections can no longer be legally challenged. Had this shortcoming been ascertained by the Slovak Electoral Commission, it would have had to give DU 24 hours to eliminate this shortcoming and secure in the course of one day the missing signatures. Because it is no longer possible to give DU this chance and because this party won a quarter of a million votes in the elections—that is, many more than the required 10,000 signatures—the whole matter is redundant. It is therefore absolutely pointless to address the matter.

[Gembicky] We would also like to know your opinion on a government of great compromise or, as the case may be, a government of experts....

[Carnogursky] As for a government of experts, I am rather skeptical as to whether it would resolve Slovakia's problems. I am thinking of a government of nonpolitical experts. One of the reasons for my skepticism is that the Slovak Constitution does not endow such a cabinet with any special powers, compared with a normal government. All of these speculations about a caretaker government or a government of experts are rooted in inertia from the constitution of interwar Czechoslovakia, which had provisions for a so-called caretaker government. The president had the right to appoint into it nonpolitical experts for half a year. Parliament could not pass a vote of no confidence in it. In other words, the caretaker government was not subject to parliamentary control, but new elections had to be held after six months. There exists no such provision in our Constitution, and it is therefore pointless in Slovakia to speak about the possibility of establishing a government of experts.

[Gembicky] And what about a government of great compromise?

[Carnogursky] But we did propose exactly such a government: a coalition of the HZDS, the KDH, Common Choice, DU, and possibly some other parties. It was the HZDS that did not accept this concept.

[Gembicky] Did the HZDS reject it once and for all, or is there still a chance of this idea being resuscitated?

[Carnogursky] This will not be the subject of our talks with the HZDS.

[Gembicky] Do you allow for the possibility of new early elections?

[Carnogursky] From the KDH's point of view, only if public opinion polls indicted repeatedly and with sufficient credibility an election result different from the last one.

Janicina Gives Reasons for HZDS Opposition

AU2911090894 Bratislava SME in Slovak 24 Nov 94 p 2

[Interview with Privatization Minister Milan Janicina by Juraj Hrabko; place and date not given: "The Strategic Investors Are From the HZDS and the SDL"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Hrabko] Your ministry is proposing to the Finance Ministry that the start of the preliminary round of coupon privatization be declared on 5 December 1994. Does this mean that everything is in order?

[Janicina] Yes. We have prepared property amounting to 62.8 billion korunas [Sk]. This is not much, but it is property that makes coupon privatization meaningful. It makes sense to launch it.

[Hrabko] Could you try to guess what reasons the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] could have, apart from political ones, for expressing its disagreement with this date?

[Janicina] I see a possible reason in the fact that property worth Sk10 billion has been included in coupon privatization in recent weeks. A probable reason will be that enterprises that require a strategic investor have also been included in it, and, consequently, it is necessary to reassess it and postpone the start of coupon privatization.

[Hrabko] What are strategic investors, and what enterprises are they interested in?

[Janicina] For example, enterprises such as Slovensky hodvab [Slovak Silk] Senica, Petrochema Dubova, Duslo Sala, and Matadorbelt. People who have very close links to the Union of Industry and the Association of Employers' Unions and who are politically close to the HZDS and the SDL [Party of the Democratic Left] are interested in these enterprises. These are strategic investors.

HZDS Handling of Privatization Criticized

95CH0041A Bratislava SLOBODNY PIATOK in Slovak 27 Oct 94 p 8

[Commentary by Ivo Grycz: "The Sins of Meciar's Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is a general parliamentary practice that the president as a rule entrusts the forming of a government to the chairman of the victorious party or movement. At the same time, he should ponder whether the person in question has adequate political and moral prerequisites to form a stable government. Let us therefore remind ourselves of the methods and quality of the decisionmaking of Meciar's Cabinet as a warning of possible consequences if he is named again.

Sin No. 1: Privatization within the family. The more lucrative the enterprises were that found their way to the discussion table of Meciar's government, the greater was the interest in the possibility of their privatization because such privatization would lead to the fulfillment of personal political and economic ambitions of a narrow interest group close to Meciar's government. We have to point out three privatization projects, in particular, that were approved by Meciar's government: State Enterprise Slovakofarma Hlohovec, Kovohuty Krompachy, and Skloobal Inc. Nemsova. It is clear that

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in all three instances there was abuse of power by a public official, and, therefore, the government turned the case over to the Prosecutor General's office for criminal prosecution.

In the case of Slovakofarma Hlohovec, unwarranted preferential treatment was given to the firm SL-PHARMA HOLDING, GmbH Vienna, which allegedly was to bring foreign exchange resources to the Slovak Republic during the process of privatization. However, it had no relevant guarantees for obtaining them. In spite of that, the government approved the privatization project, according to which shares with the face value of 1,081,104,000 Slovak korunas [Sk] were to Be sold to it for the purchase price of Sk1.528 billion, the first payment to be made in the amount of Sk856 million in freely convertible currency. SL-PHARMA HOLDING, GmbH Vienna was to overinvest Sk663 million in the enterprise by the year 1997, and, according to the privatization project, it would have the purchase price reduced by that amount. Slovakofarma Hlohovec has been profitable for a long time, and expectations are that it will continue to show profit in the future. Yet the former government approved the sale of the majority portion of its shares for approximately a one-year profit of this enterprise to a company that, according to the notarial deed, was founded on 19 November 1993 by 10 citizens of the Slovak Republic in Vienna. In the case of Kovohuty Krompachy, the government approved direct sale of 51 percent of its shares for the purchase price of Sk153 million to Copper Krompachy, Inc. In doing so, it did not take into consideration the interest shown in this privatization by the foreign investors HUSSEY COPPER Pittsburgh-USA and ETF-FRG. The offer of the U.S. investor was particularly interesting for Slovakia because it contained the purchase price of Sk300 million payable in yearly installments of Sk50 million over a five-year period and further investments in the amount of Sk817 million. In spite of this competitive climate, created by the natural interest of various investors, the former government decided to accept the least advantageous offer, ignoring the other interested investors.

Interest in Skloobal Inc. Nemsova was expressed by several foreign entities, of which the one with the best offer and the most persistent was ZIGNAGO VETRO (Italy). This company offered to pay the purchase price of Sk300 million, invest Sk1,000 billion, buy up inventories in the amount of Sk80 million, and possibly also increase the price by about Sk50 million. These facts, however, were concealed during the privatization of Skloobal Nemsova, and the government approved the purchase of 67 percent of the shares of this enterprise for the purchase price of Sk120,600,000. The purchaser was a new company—Obalsklo Nemsova Inc.—which was registered with the court on the day the privatization project was approved. It should be pointed out that the founders of this corporation are members of the Skloobal Nemsova management.

The cited examples show that, in approving privatization projects, the former government did not follow the fundamental laws of the market—offer, demand, and the advantages of a given offer. In addition, dangerous priority was given to narrow interest groups to the detriment of the broad strata of Slovak citizens. These are methods by which a financial-political oligarchy is often created, which then becomes a parasite on the state and society. Power groups of a similar kind tend to create various families that will stop at very little in the pursuit of their interests. Around the world, these are generally called the mafias.

Present risks: Vladimir Meciar makes no secret of the fact that he intends to stop voucher privatization for a time. As the official reason, he repeats the well-known arguments about selling off property to foreigners and scares the public with the prospect of the power industry's dictatorial actions and the unbounded power of the investment funds. In reality, however, the HZDS must logically have in mind a return to direct sales to those interested parties who lost their economic power with the fall of Meciar's government in March 1994 and invested in the HZDS campaign, expecting a return on their investment. It can be anticipated that the "temporary stoppage" of voucher privatization will be of a long-term nature.

Italian Terrorist Captured in Trencin

AU2911084794 Bratislava SME in Slovak 25 Nov 94 p 1

[Article by V. Pankovcin: "A Dangerous Terrorist From Italy Has Been Arrested in Trencin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—On Tuesday, 22 November, criminal police officers in Trencin arrested an internationally sought terrorist from Italy who used to be a member of the Campo di Palmi organization and, among other things, had taken part in the kidnapping of a judge and other crimes. Forty-year-old S.B. had been sought internationally by Interpol, and the Italian police have requested his extradition. This information was released yesterday by General Stefan Lastovka, president of the Police Corps Presidium.

According to him, the Campo di Palmi organization is closely associated with the well-known Brigate Rosse terrorist organization. Although we have been unable to verify this, it is possible that the terrorist S.B. has been moving around our territory since 1993. He had been sentenced to 16 years and nine months imprisonment in Italy. However, he managed to escape from prison and, after a while, settled in Slovakia. It is not known if he conducted any criminal activity on our territory. By all accounts, however, he was employed by a private company. According to Lastovka, S.B. is currently in prison in Bratislava. Talks on his extradition are under way between the police forces of the two states.

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Government's Approach To Help Minorities Abroad

AU2811193594 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 25 Nov 94 p 2

["N.M.E."-attributed article: "New Approach to Support for Hungarians Beyond the Border"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian Government is reexamining the support system for the Hungarian minorities living in the neighboring countries. The financial aid will not be uncertain, but a powerful shift can be seen in the methods. The basic concept remains the same: It wishes to maintain (in a more clear-cut system) the already existing cultural support, however, in the long run, it wishes to form economic and financial cooperation with the neighboring countries, which would assist the local minority Hungarians to make better use of the given country's entrepreneurial, economic, and public administration facilities.

The goal is for the Hungarian minority to find its prosperity in the environment of the majority nation, conforming to its legal, economic, and business conditions, Attila Nemeth, economic department head of the Office for Hungarians Beyond the Border, said. According to the emerging ideas, the Hungarian Government can assist in this by stimulating investment in the areas of the neighboring countries inhabited by Hungarians, and by separating the cultural support from the profit oriented support.

In the interest of this, it is planned to make the Handshake [Kezfogas] Foundation that was separated from the Illyes Foundation completely independent, and this should assist the Hungarians living beyond the border in establishing their livelihood and economic enterprises, mainly with investments. The support would be awarded through open bidding, on the basis of a clear and controllable system. The foundation would be politically neutral, therefore, it would not be linked to the Hungarian organizations of any country. The section of the proposal that suggests that this support should not be ethnically limited might create a controversy. It is possible that a non-Hungarian entrepreneur will come up with an idea that would provide employment for a number of Hungarians. In order to improve the economic cooperation between Hungary and Hungarians beyond the border, the establishment of an information basis is planned that would provide data on Hungarian provisions of law, interstate agreements, and the enterprises interested in setting up links. It can give practical advice on setting up enterprises, and it would also have a service to help find business partners.

A new aspect of the concept is that the government, in addition to informing the Hungarians in the neighboring countries on the possibilities, also wishes to discuss the economic cooperation to be established with the governments of these countries. It would like to make everyone aware that the Hungarian Government intends to implement its policy in close cooperation with the governments of the majority nations, rather than through partisan actions.

This was the purpose of Nemeth's trip to Belgrade and Vojvodina last week, and to Kiev this week. He will also visit Bucharest, Bratislava, and Vienna. Naturally, the revival of trade links with Rump Yugoslavia will only be possible after the lifting of the embargo, but preliminary expert talks are underway at the moment.

Slovak Minority Demands Preservation of Identity

LD2811205494 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Ethnic Slovaks living in Hungary demand autonomy. Ildiko Nagy reports from Pozsony [Bratislava]:

[Nagy] The Slovak minority living in Hungary are threatened with total assimilation, for none of the minorities living in the Carpathian basin has seen such a rapid decrease in the number of their community. This is included, among other things, in a statement forwarded by the national leadership of the Association of Slovaks in Hungary to TASR [Slovak news agency].

In its statement the association intends to call public attention to the fact of rapid assimilation and asks every Hungarian citizen, party, organization, and medium to view with understanding their activity and their endeavor for the preservation of their national identity. Their aim is to preserve their Slovak national awareness. At the same time, they would like to live and work as responsible citizens of the Hungarian Republic.

Excercising their rights laid down in laws, they intend to establish self-governments [onkormanyzat] at local level, in the capital Budapest, and at national level. This is laid down, among other things, in the statement sent by the Association of Slovaks in Hungary to TASR.

Bias, Political Dismissals at TV, Radio Charged

95CH0044A Budapest UJ DEMOKRATA in Hungarian 6 Oct 94 pp 21-23

[Unattributed article based on a report by the Community of Hungarian Journalists: "Media Front; All-Around Attack; Saturation Bombing and Laser Operation; Report on Purges Implemented at the Hungarian Television and the Hungarian Radio"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 22 September 1994, the Community of Hungarian Journalists [MUK] issued a 16 page, English language report, with details on the kinds of purges the current coalition has implemented in the public service media. MUK forwarded the report to the Association of European Broadcasters, to other nongovernmental organs, to foreign reporters accredited in Budapest, to the embassies, to the major newspapers of the world, to English language weeklies published in

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Budapest, to journalists' associations abroad, and to Arpad Goncz, Gyula Horn, and the presidents of MTV [Hungarian Television] and MR [Hungarian Radio]. Significant findings contained in that document follow.

After the fall of communism, Hungary became one of the few Eastern bloc countries where communist journalists at the public service media were allowed to stay in place. This has happened despite the fact that MTV, and even more so, MR, had been fortresses of reliable cadres before, where the Interior Ministry thoroughly examined the political reliability, and the socialist loyalty of persons to be hired, in many cases extending to the prospective employees' parents and relatives. Frightened [by the fall of communism], the employees of these two institutions were prepared to leave. And yet, after four decades of communist rule, the first democratically elected government chose to leave the personnel of these two institutions intact.

Toward the end of 1993, when the Hungarian legislature decided to discontinue supporting the public service radio, 80 journalists were dismissed, and 50 of the 2,100 employees were retired. These were the so-called "129," of whom both the Hungarian, and the international press reported. Two reasons prompted dismissals [in the Antall era]. Journalists who were told to leave have been spending their time pursuing political discourse, failing to perform their tasks. Editors who had to leave were those who, according to the management of the radio, had violated ethical rules of conduct concerning objectivity and decency.

A flood of angry articles appeared in those days about the dismissals, and a large volume of erroneous information saw the light of day. For example, THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote about the dismissal of 200 persons, and stated that Csaba Gombar, the former president of MR, and Elemer Hankiss, the former president of MTV, were among them. Another example for deception was a letter published in London THE TIMES. Peter Galliner, the head of the International Press Institute, the author of the letter, had this to say: The dismissals reminded him of the bloody reprisals that followed the 1956 Hungarian revolution.

Prior to the 1994 elections, the officers of both the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] and the left-wing liberal Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] declared that they were seeking an opportunity for societal reconciliation and for a peaceful conclusion of the media war. But other voices could also be heard. SZDSZ Chairman Ivan Peto told a small circulation monthly journal that dismissals would be necessary at the public service media. TV journalist Gyorgy Balo, who has launched from abroad harsh attacks against the previous dismissals from the media before, at this time called for saturation bombing and laser operation.

The communists and their left-wing allies did not waste time and energy after the May elections. They dismissed and relieved of their duties executives, and silenced several hundred employees working for the electronic media.

If we were to ask reporters stationed in Budapest to state their private views concerning their present silence, the answer would be as follows: They are not sufficiently informed in this regard, and their readers, their audience is really not interested in these events. This comes as a surprise, because the present mass dismissals in Hungary, which were not limited to the electronic media, but also swept through the ministries, government supervisory institutions, major state-owned enterprises, and semi privately owned plants, not sparing the government guards either, took place in the wake of a simple change in government, and not a historic change in the system. (...)

Hungarian Television

On Szabadsag Square, across from the American Embassy, television journalists work in fear in the richly ornate building of the MTV. (...) People are being dismissed on the spot, forced to retire, relieved of their duties, and silenced. At least 300 persons were ordered off the television screens, or removed from their editorial or managerial desks. At the same time, employees retired a long time ago from the public service media, are returning. The following persons have been removed from their positions since the new government has taken office:

—Alajos Chrudinak, head of the Foreign Affairs Main Editorial Office and the Documentary Editorial Office, and editor in chief of "Panorama;"

—Andras Sugar, leading executive of "Panorama";

—Balazs Varkonyi, head of the Domestic Affairs Main Editorial Office;

—L. Mihaly Kocsis, program director;

—Istvan Stefka, "News Report" ["Hirado"] editor;

—Miklos Hajdufy, production director;

—Gyorgy Czigany, head of the Music and Literature Main Editorial Office;

—Istvan Kiszely, an associate of international fame working for "Panorama," a recognized anthropologist and author;

—Katalin Liebmann, program director of the evening "News Report";

—Marta Frolich, lead editor of the Entertainment Division;

—more than 50 reporters and editors of "News Report";

—about 80 persons working for the nonpolitical program entitled "Hello Sunday" ["Hallo, Vasarnap"];

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—Tamas Sipos, journalist, writer;

—Mihaly Dezsy, reporter;

—Henriette Novak, fashion editor;

—the entire staff of the popular Sunday magazine "The Week" ["A HET"];

—the entire staff of the nightly political program "24 Ora";

—Janos Sedianszky, an executive;

—Lajos Bolba, music director;

—Peter Kovari, editor in chief;

—Laszlo Muranyi, editor;

—Miklos Hornyik, deputy editor in chief;

—Zsuzsa Erdei, deputy production director;

—Csaba Szulyovszky, lead editor;

—Endre Papp, head of the editorial office;

—Csaba Csendes, columnist;

—V. Laszlo Simon, lead editor;

—Viktor Tihanyi, counselor;

—Lajos Peter Kovacs, historian;

—all legal advisers.

The above list is, by far, not complete.

Considering the fact that most of the privately owned media is dominated by daily newspapers, television stations, and radio stations with ties to the present government, the producers who now lose their jobs are practically blacklisted, and will be unable to find work in their profession. If, as expected, the new media law converts the MTV into a stock corporation, workers will lose their public employee status, and management will be able to dismiss workers by giving 30 days notice, with no duty to provide cause for dismissals.

A Portrait of the New People

The Public Employee Law stipulates that persons to be appointed to leading positions must be graduates of academies or universities. Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, the newly appointed state secretary of the Foreign Ministry, references this condition established by law, in an effort to justify the dismissal of a number of his ministerial employees.

It is worth noting that two high-ranking executives at the MTV, who occupy much higher positions than the employees dismissed from the Foreign Ministry, lack this required educational background. For example, 25-year old Pal Szombathy, formerly a reporter at MAGYAR HIRLAP, and now the head of the Domestic Affairs Main Editorial Office, has no higher educational qualifications. Peter Nemeth, the editor in chief, and former party secretary at the same newspaper has, just now, been dismissed by the Swiss owner of MAGYAR HIRLAP because of his four year linkage with the free democrats. Thanks to his political connections, a few days later Peter Nemeth was appointed to become the director of Nap TV. Neither he, nor Szombathy have any experience in television.

The appointment of news director Laszlo Kasza was also in violation of the Public Employee Law, because he did not acquire qualifications from any academy or university. Nor does he have any television experience. The insensitivity of the new leadership is indicated by the fact, that Mr. Kasza, admittedly and atheist, is also the supervisor of religious programs. Other duties include the supervision of programs concerning Hungarians beyond the borders, even though during his previous career at the radio, he was one of those who censored Bishop Laszlo Tokes's statements. His deputy, Anna Sardi, is the former spokesperson for the free democrats. (...)

The Hungarian Radio

In sharp contrast to people in the MTV building, no one is scared in the corridors of MR, except for a handful of managers, and a few dozen journalists deprived of their microphones. They were just relieved of their duties. The editors, reporters, and producers who rejoice now are mainly those who ardently support the new government, and especially the new government's smaller, left-wing liberal party. They rejoice, because their old and new masters are returning. An ostentatious 75th birthday congratulatory letter to former MR President Istvan Hars by his former employees shows that these employees sympathize with totalitarianism. In earlier days, Hars served as deputy minister of the interior; during the Kadar era he hindered the free flow of information. This letter—signed by virtually every editor of the MR—was intended to be a symbolic gesture toward the new president of the MR.

Upon cancellation of the program 168 ORA—whose editors never veiled their commitment to the SZDSZ—prior to the 1994 elections, newspaper articles claimed that the banning of this program served as proof of the antidemocratic attitudes harbored by the Hungarian Government. Today the MR, and the very popular "Vasarnapi Ujsag"—the only MTV program spared, at least temporarily, of being totally revamped—presents, where permitted, the traditional topics (Hungarian minorities beyond the borders, the communist past, efforts made by the previous government to provide compensation, the importance of religion, the institutions of the churches, etc.) albeit, undoubtedly, in an increasingly restrained tone of voice. (...)

Gyorgy Vamos, the new director of documentaries eminently exemplifies the new leadership of the MR. He has been a communist party worker until the mid-seventies, and he does not speak any foreign languages. Magdolna

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Cseve, the previous director of documentaries, who was immediately relieved of her duties on grounds that "she does not enjoy the confidence of the new leadership," speaks fluent English and German. Since 1977 she has been representing the MR in the International Association of Sound Archives, whose approximately 500 members come from all over the world. In 1983 she was elected to become the chair person of the Radio Archives Committee, and since 1987 she has been the vice chairman of the Association itself. Cseve has not been a member of any political party. (...)

From a practical standpoint, the entire upper level leadership has been changed. They removed from their positions Program Director Terezia Katona; Director of Documentaries Magdolna Cseve; Kossuth Radio and Bartok Radio Editors in Chief Jozsef P. Szabo and Szilard Nyakas respectively, as well as their deputies; Music Editor in Chief Imre Kiss and his deputy, Gyozo Fehervari; Lead Director Sandor Pos; as well as Education Division Chief Laszlo Kerekes. (...)

The Hungarian Radio scorns on a daily basis everything that has to do with religion, and everything that is Hungarian (except the Hungarian socialist tradition); it undermines authority (except the authority of socialist heroes, or socialist and communist thinkers), and does not tolerate ideas inconsistent with socialist and left-wing liberal ideology. The hourly news reports are not consistent with professional requirements either. They frequently begin with news reports of a protocol nature (such as the journey of the president of the republic to distant, exotic regions), and present important news for only a few seconds at the end of broadcasts, if at all. For example, when a small Cessna airplane crashed into the White House lawn in Washington, news about the suicidal pilot became the lead item in the newscasts of every major radio and television station throughout the world. In contrast, Kossuth Radio's "Noon Chronicle," the most important MR news report, began with President Goncz's trip to Mongolia, and the Washington incident was reported toward the end of the program.

It has been the custom of MR news editors educated under the communist system, to treat commentaries published in foreign newspapers as news. An article attacking the previous government turned into news instantly. They never failed to present articles critical of the previous government that appeared in THE NEW YORK TIMES. This practice has changed by now. A. M. Rosenthal reported on his visit to Hungary, and his conversation with Prime Minister Horn in the 9 August 1994 issue of THE NEW YORK TIMES under the heading "Ghost Nation." The INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE republished the article the next day. This news was fully suppressed by both the public service and the private media in Hungary. This is more than odd, because the material contained a "Waldheimian" sensation, of which not even Rosenthal had been aware. When Rosenthal asked the Hungarian prime minister about his role as a member of the special police in 1956, Horn replied by saying that as a student he had been forced to join that organization. Well, the truth is that Horn had completed his schooling two years before the revolution, and the Hungarian prime minister had more than once stated that he had volunteered to become a member of the special police. He says the same in his autobiography, although he claims that he was only guarding bridges. (...)

Conclusion

The community of Hungarian journalists is not so naive as to believe that the information provided herein is going to appear on the front pages of foreign newspapers, or, for that matter, that it is going to be reported at all. (...) We believe that using a double standard is indecent. (...) If a few months ago, the dismissal of journalists for economic or political reasons gave rise to claims by Western newspapers that the freedom of the press was being crushed in Hungary, and that the dismissals presented a threat to democracy and stability, and if organizations of journalists also alerted the European Broadcast Union, today's purely political purges also merit to gain similar significance, and to convey a similar message.

We still remember well, the way the experienced old guard of the MR and the MTV proclaimed the leaders of these two institutions [during the Antall era] to be of an extreme right-wing persuasion, and to be fascists. But we also recall, how cleverly the Komintern and the Soviet government utilized the Western press to call for disarmament and for the peace movement, while Soviet leaders feverishly armed themselves, and oppressed their peoples to a degree never before seen. (...)

But the facts remain facts. For example, if we compare the air time allotted to Jozsef Antall, the prime minister after the 1990 elections, during the initial months after forming his cabinet, with the broadcast time allotted to Horn and Kuncze during their initial months after forming a cabinet, it is hard to deny that the partisan linkage of the leaders of the electronic media has something to do with the frequent television and radio appearances of the present coalition.

A year has passed since Gabor Nahlik, then head of the MTV, has been attacked both in Hungary and abroad for terminating the "Balance" program. For the press to be fully free, television has to present both sides of an issue in its news programs, they wrote at the time. The men from "Balance" have returned by now. Their present conduct amply proves that their previous demand for openness and tolerance only amounted to a trick. And it appears by now that no one, neither they, nor their supporters recall that unlike now, a year ago freedom of the press meant two evening television news reports.

Gabor Nahlik held a press conference a few weeks after he terminated "Balance." It was attended by a respectable number of foreign journalist reporting from Hungary. A smiling Peter Maas of THE WASHINGTON

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POST challenged Gabor Nahlik to name a single sensational event or the exposition of an event by the news organization Palfy led. (...) All that is left of this episode is the smile, for neither Maas, nor any other journalist questions the kinds of sensations the present "News Report" has to offer. Raising such questions would be in vain anyway: According to Editor in Chief Janos Betlen, "News Report's" function is not to unveil the events, but to reflect them.

Poll Shows Decrease of Confidence in Government

AU2811211194 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 28 Nov 94 pp 1, 2

[Bela Marian report: "Citizens Are Dissatisfied With the Government's Work—Marketing Center Assessment Commissioned by NEPSZAVA"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since the end of September, an increasing number of people have been able to form an opinion on the government's activities. Citizens continue to be dissatisfied with the economic results and the majority only finds the cabinet's democratic commitment and foreign policy satisfactory. This has been demonstrated through the public opinion survey of the Marketing Center National Market Research Institute commissioned by NEPSZAVA between 28 October and 2 November.

Confidence in political institutions did not change significantly between the end of September and the end of October. People continue to have most faith in supra-party institutions, and least confidence in the parties themselves. However, serious changes lie behind the relatively steady averages. Supporters of the Independent Smallholders Party [FKGP] have become disenchanted with almost all institutions, especially with the electronic and printed media. The probable reason is that, Jozsef Toryan [FKGP Chairman] recently mentioned many times on television, radio, and the newspapers that the FKGP is being discriminated against by these institutions.

The fact that supporters of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] have reconciled themselves to the president of the republic was the other important change in the past month. This is noteworthy because confidence in the president was lowest among the MDF voters for years. It is only Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] voters who still really trust in the government and generally have more confidence in political institutions than the voters of other parties.

At the end of September, 15 percent of the questioned people could not express an opinion on the work of the Horn government but this proportion has now decreased to 8 percent. Nevertheless, people's general impressions have not changed, which means that they continue to be only slightly satisfied with the government's activities.

The coalition parties are most popular with those people who are at least more satisfied than dissatisfied, but only 48 percent of the MSZP's voters and one-fifth of the voters of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] hold this view. In other words, the supporters of government parties are also critical of the cabinet's operation and, at the same time, opposition party supporters do not completely reject the cabinet's work.

Views on the government also largely depend on the individual's interest in politics: Those who are more interested in politics show a greater understanding toward government; people who are not at all interested in politics reject it most. This also signifies that the majority of the opinions are not the result of careful political-science analysis, rather, people tend to hold the government accountable for their own living circumstances. This is even more clear when people assess the government's activities according to its various operations.

People condemn the government mainly because of the nonexistent economic upturn, and MSZP and SZDSZ voters are at least as critical in this respect as opposition supporters. At the same time, if parliamentary elections were "held this Sunday," the coalition parties would win with the same proportion they did in May. The data also show that an increasing number of people are willing to express their views on the government in all areas, and this means that, after all, people must have gained some experience of higher politics, and that they can distinguish between forced measures that have unpleasant consequences and bad decisions.

The research was carried out on a sample of 1,000 randomly selected people through a personal interview with a questionnaire. The sample's deviation from the distribution expected on the basis of the 1990 population census was corrected through weighting, therefore, it adequately reflects the population according to residence, gender, age, and education. The error margin of the data is between 3 and 6 percent, depending on the number of replies collected.

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Coalition Rejects Okonski for Defense Minister

LD2911100994 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 0900 GMT 29 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The coalition will not accept Zbigniew Okonski, the presidential candidate for minister of defense, or any other candidate who does not enjoy the trust and support of the ruling parties, Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] spokesman, said.

On the other hand, Siemiatkowski, who was Polish radio's guest today, did not rule out the SLD's support for the prime minister's proposal that a politician not affiliated with either the Belweder or any political party be appointed defense minister.

Representatives of the PSL-SLD [Polish Peasant Party-Democratic Left Alliance] coalition are now discussing the appointment of the head of the Ministry of National Defense.

Pawlak's Candidate Refuses Post

LD2911120394 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1100 GMT 29 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The candidacy of Ryszard Kaczorowski, former president of the Polish Republic in exile, to the post of minister of national defense is being considered, Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak said today.

[Pawlak] This is a possibility to link emigre circles in a very practical manner, maybe the last chance to contribute to the future of Poland.

[Voice of unidentified correspondent] Has the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] agreed to this proposal?

[Pawlak] This proposal needs to be considered, and I understand that the SLD needs time to consider such a proposal. We will soon see the outcome of these consultations.

[Announcer] The government coalition met this morning, before the meeting of the government, during which the prime minister informed the SLD leadership of his candidate for the post of minister of national defense. After the meeting, SLD leader Aleksander Kwasniewski confirmed that Ryszard Kaczorowski is the prime minister's candidate for the post of minister of national defense. However, he did not say if this candidacy is acceptable.

We have just spoken on the phone with Ryszard Kaczorowski, who is in London, on his candidacy for the post of defense minister:

[Begin recording] [Kaczorowski] I have not put forward my candidacy for this post because of my age. I will not go into detail.

[Unidentified correspondent] Does that mean that you refused the prime minister?

[Kaczorowski] Probably, yes.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, did the prime minister ask you at all?

[Kaczorowski] No. What I have said on this issue should be sufficient. So, there is the prime minister's statement, and there is my reply to it. [end recording]

Commentary on Visegrad Group, CEFTA Summit

WS2911102594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 28 Nov 94 p 5

[Editorial by Jan Skorzynski: "Trade and Politics"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Does the Visegrad Group still exist? Such doubts were raised after the comments made by Vaclav Klaus, who did not waste any opportunity to emphasize his reservations to the idea of close-knit cooperation between the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Gyula Horn made a similar statement just before coming to Warsaw, calling upon the Central European states to enter virtuous rivalry for membership in the European Union [EU] and NATO. The Visegrad capitals tend to think that joining the Western structures independently may be easier and faster than as a group.

This will probably worry many Polish enthusiasts, who see far-reaching cooperation between Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, and Bratislava as a necessary step on the path toward West European economic and military unity. First of all, it is not clear whether this is still the point of view of Brussels. Second, and more important, lack of new stimuli for integration with the West does not imply a slowing down of regional integration trends.

Not without reason, the meeting in Poznan was devoted primarily to the liberalization of trade exchange and the possibility of broadening CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Association]. The most important element of relations between countries of Central Europe is changing from politics to economics. CEFTA agreements are gradually becoming more important than the unfinished concept of the Visegrad Group.

Politics is giving way to trade. Is that not good? The history of the EU shows that it may be a better method of integration than jointly waiting in the antechambers of Brussels.

Majority of Poles Support Membership in EU

WS2911120294 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 28 Nov 94 pp 1, 11

[Article by "D.W.": "Poles Would Say 'Yes' to the Union"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *People in Norway, one of the four countries aspiring to join the European Union [EU] next*

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year, voted on Sunday and Monday on whether they want to become part of the Union. It is difficult to predict the final results because there are as many people against as there are for integration with the European economic giant.

How would Poles vote if they were asked the same question? Of course, it is difficult to answer that question definitively because we would have to know what the exact conditions of our membership would be. Generally speaking, additional benefits would result from joining the EU, but also additional costs. With this restriction in mind, we phrased our question: "Should Poland join the EU?" A surprising 72 percent of adult Poles said "yes," 8 percent were against, and 21 percent did not have an opinion. The poll was conducted by the Sopot-based Social Research laboratory [PBS].

Men tend to support our membership in the EU more often: 75 percent believe that Poland should join the G-12, as compared with 65 percent of women who claim likewise. Among women, 25.5 percent were undecided. The largest supporters are people with higher education (86 percent "for"), inhabitants of large cities (83 percent), household members earning 3 million zlotys per month (85 percent), employees of private companies (80 percent) and state firms (80 percent), and management-level employees and representatives of the trade sector (88 percent and 84 percent, respectively).

As far as political attitudes are concerned, the majority of EU integration supporters are supporters of the Freedom Union and the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms—over 80 percent in each case. Many supporters are to be found among supporters of the Union of Labor—77 percent.

The results of a referendum in the countryside would probably also be positive. From among supporters of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], 71 percent are for joining the EU. Within this group, 54 percent are farm workers, and only 46.5 percent are farmers themselves. Supporters of Self-Defense most fear integration.

Among those undecided as to whether integration would be good for us are primarily women, especially housewives, as well as people with poorer education, within the lowest income group, pensioners or unemployed, and unqualified manual workers living in the countryside or in small towns, voting for the PSL.

It is very characteristic that these groups of Poles look with apprehension on our joining the EU. This is possibly the result of a lack of knowledge (inability to get information to these groups?) that Poland, as a country far poorer than the current G-12 members, would be a net beneficiary of aid projects. Even if some farmers did have to fallow their land, as happened before in the EU, they would receive compensation from a special fund. That is why not all EU countries are eager to admit Poland as a member.

The poll was conducted by PBS on 19-20 November 1994, on a representative sample of 1,030 adult Poles.

Do you think Poland should join the EU?	
Yes	71%
No	8%
Hard to say	21%

Walesa Statement Explaining Veto of Tax Law

WS2811152694 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 28 Nov 94 p 4

[Text of President Walesa's veto of the tax law: "Taxes Have To Be Stable"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On passing the law on mass income tax on 26 July 1991, the Sejm stated that the high tax rates—20, 30, and 40 percent—would be gradually decreased, in accordance with the reform of the system for financing the state's public objectives. A valorization of the tax base (the so-called thresholds) was also predicted, proportional to the growth of inflation.

Meanwhile, as early as 1993, the valorization of thresholds was withheld by way of a legislative decision that was deemed a violation of the principles of a legal state by the Constitutional Tribunal in 1994.

The tax rates citizens expected to be lowered were temporarily increased (21, 33, and 45 percent, respectively) for a period of one year.

Recipience of the temporary rates on a permanent basis in the law one month before the beginning of the new fiscal year violates the principle of the stability and certitude of the tax law, threatening economic stability and halting long-term projections for the development of economic entities.

I see the need to seek other sources of revenues for the state budget. I would consider these to consist not in an additional emptying of employee and senior citizen pockets, but in rendering the tax system more efficient and defined, so that it could include the very wide, so-called gray sector and put an end to the practice of concealing true earnings, feigning bankruptcy, and creating chainlike interdependencies between companies.

Raising tax rates instead of lowering them will lead people to either stay within or flee to the gray sector, and the price for that will be paid by people whose earnings are registered—namely, hired workers, pensioners, and even the unemployed, from whose benefits taxes are deducted upon payment. The real profit for the budget may prove marginal in this case.

The government, in particular the Ministry of Finance, should take specific executive action to tax incomes from undefined sources, systematically audit tax statements, and take legal action to increase the effectiveness of tax collection. As the practice of many European countries

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has shown, lowering taxes instead of raising them can contribute to the laying down of principles for honest economic activity and the conscientious paying of taxes.

Inflation in Poland is causing public savings to decrease and investments to become more expensive to realize. Building one's own house or apartment within a housing cooperative or adapting a site to meet housing needs with practically no prospects for financial assistance from the state constitutes a huge financial burden over many years for the entire family. Thus, Article 26, Paragraphs 3 and 11 of the Income Tax Law provided that the value of housing investments would be valorized on an annual basis, in accordance with the guaranteed premium on savings in housing saving accounts.

Freezing the valorization mentioned in Article 6, Paragraph 5 of the law in question, dated 16 November 1994, may bring operations already under way to a standstill and will deprive installment payers of an opportunity to gather the minimum sum required by housing cooperatives, which is taken into account when calculating the income tax.

The provision of Article 6, Paragraph 5 of the law in question violates the principle of stability of the law on regulating long-term investments. During the investment process, the principles of financing are changed without any alternative suggestions (such as new principles for housing credits).

In light of the above, I would like to make a motion for the law to be reviewed and for the proposed amendments to be abandoned.

[Signed] Lech Walesa

UP, SLD on Overriding Veto

WS2811130494 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 28 Nov 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Jan Bazyl Lipszyc: "Will UP Help Override President's Veto?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The preliminary offer made by the Union of Labor [UP], supporting the coalition in the vote to override the president's veto in return for guarantees that the 1996 law on personal income taxes will be altered very significantly, is acceptable to the coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL].

Lech Walesa stated on 25 November that he would not sign the tax law of 16 November because the law maintains the tax scale that was to be binding only in 1994. Besides, limits on the amount of money that can be spent on home renovations were frozen, which was also illegal. If the president's veto were accepted, it would mean that next year's budget revenues would decrease by approximately 12 trillion zlotys, representatives of the coalition claim. The coalition must collect two-thirds of the votes to override the veto. The arithmetic in the Sejm indicates that the votes of the PSL and the SLD alone will not be enough.

The SLD's Marek Borowski believes that there is a good chance of winning UP's support because one of the solutions the president vetoed was a motion submitted by this party. Therefore, he is convinced that serious talks with UP will be held and that it should not be a great problem to reach an agreement. The initiative to start the talks should be exhibited by the prime minister.

According to Borowski, the problem that the veto has brought up is not a discussion of the tax law but a question of whether democracy in Poland, with its parliamentary-cabinet system and a president who has specific powers, can work. Borowski asks: Can the government govern when it has only two-thirds of the votes in the Sejm or when it has half of the votes in a situation in which the president can always veto laws he does not like? This leads to an absurd situation. Therefore, serious political parties, including opposition groups, should override the veto to put an end to such a method of playing politics.

UP Leader Ryszard Bugaj said that he is convinced that UP might back the coalition, but, before that, certain conditions would have to be met. Bugaj said, however, that he only expressed his personal opinion because he had not consulted with the party's leadership. He recalled that UP wanted to introduce an 18-percent tax bracket for people with the lowest incomes, as well as tax breaks for raising children.

From the formal point of view, there are two possibilities: Either the veto should be overridden, or a new law should be prepared, said Ryszard Bugaj. "If the coalition reached an agreement with UP on rejection of the veto, it would have to guarantee significant changes in the 1996 tax law. The changes would really have to be far-reaching. Now, if a new law were prepared, it would have to include UP's proposals."

The money the budget would lose as a result of the changes would have to be compensated for in the budget—either by changes in the tax rates and brackets or by changes in the tax breaks, the UP leader said.

"In my opinion, this is what UP's offer might be," said Bugaj. "However, the coalition might also ask Freedom Union [UW] to support it, just as was the case when the corporate law on above-normative pay increases was rejected." He believes, however, that this is not very likely.

According to Marek Borowski, such an offer from UP is acceptable, but the idea of preparing a new law is unrealistic. Thus, what might be done is to prepare a new law next year. The SLD supports significant changes in the personal income tax in 1996, including the introduction of a fourth tax bracket, which has been proposed by UP.

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UW's Jerzy Osiatynski, who also expressed his personal opinion, said: "I do not think that UW might help override the veto because the president disagrees with the maintenance of the higher tax rates, which is in line with the stand taken by UW on this issue." Osiatynski stressed that the president expertly drew attention to the redistributional nature of the budget. Because over 90 percent of the budget's revenues from this tax are provided by taxpayers who are in the lowest tax bracket, the maintenance of the 21-percent rate instead of a 20-percent rate means that money is taken away from some of the poor people and given to others (or even the same people). In addition, during this operation, some of the money goes down the drain in the inefficient administrative structures. Therefore, Jerzy Osiatynski argues, the argument that the president's veto is to transfer the burden from the rich to the poor is false.

It does not seem possible that the coalition deputies will be backed by the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms or the Confederation for an Independent Poland. These parties voted in the same manner as UW—against the tax law in its present form. UP's support should be sufficient to override the president's veto—if we assume, of course, that the deputies of the coalition and UP will obey discipline during the vote as much as the opposition.

More on UP Plan

WS2811150594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 28 Nov 94 p 2

[Article by Eliza Olczyk: "Inconsistent UP Policy; Taming the President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Limiting the president's powers to veto laws, liquidating or transforming the second house of parliament, social guarantees, and separation of church from state—these are the four conditions the Chief Council of the Union of Labor [UP] considers necessary for the party to support the proposed constitution. UP intends to ask Prime Minister Pawlak to explain the charges leveled against him by the WPROST weekly. It has also announced that it will vote against the 1995 budget.

Limiting the president's powers is the one issue concerning the state's political system that UP wants most to change. According to UP Leader Ryszard Bugaj, the president's veto can now effectively paralyze the activities of any government that does not have a two-thirds' majority in the Sejm.

"This can be done especially by a president who has been elected for a second term and who, in line with the law, cannot be elected a third time. Only God and history can call such a president to account for his activities," Bugaj said.

Limit Walesa

The president recently refused to sign the tax law. According to Bugaj, the arguments that the president submitted while rejecting the law were not very convincing (the president vetoed the law because he decided that taxes are too high and tax breaks for home renovations are too small). However, UP is not going to vote to just override the president's veto because it also disagrees with the tax system proposed by the government (UP is in favor of introducing an additional, smallest tax bracket for people with the lowest incomes, as well as in favor of limiting tax breaks for house-building investments).

"If the government cannot defend the tax law by itself, it has two options: It can either reach an agreement with the Freedom Union and prepare a more liberal tax system, or it can reach an agreement with us and prepare a more social-oriented law," Bugaj said.

The UP Chief Council has also decided that the parliamentary club will vote against the 1995 budget because, as the Chief Council statement reads, "it does not provide hope for improving the situation in education, health service, and the social sector."

However, if the president vetoes the budget law, UP will vote against his veto.

"The first vote will be of a substantive nature, and, in such a situation, we cannot support the budget," UP press spokesman Tomasz Nalecz explained this inconsistent attitude. "The second vote will have a political dimension, and, in this case, we have to oppose the veto, which may in fact be an attempt to dissolve parliament. We can see no reason that the parliament should be dissolved before the presidential elections."

Pawlak Must Explain

UP would like to limit the president's powers in other areas as well. "It is highly disconcerting that Lech Walesa is implementing his now-open tactics, which involve the construction of a presidential system through activities 'on the fringes of the law.' In fact, the activities often exceed these borders," the statement of the Chief Council reads. "One cannot agree to illegally subordinate to the president the Army, the special services, and the Council, which is supposed to guard the independence of public television and radio." According to the UP leaders, the so-called presidential ministries should be subordinated to the prime minister, just like all the other ministries.

Bugaj also said that he believes Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak should explain the charges leveled against him by WPROST, which suggested faults in the distribution of governmental orders, financed by taxpayer money.

"It would be best if the prime minister asked the Supreme Chamber of Control to check whether the charges are justified," Bugaj said, adding that, unless the prime minister does this, UP will demand that this issue be explained in the Sejm.

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Borowski's Questioning of Veto

WS2911093994 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 28 Nov 94 p 5

[Commentary by Jan Bazyl Lipszyc: "Defending Two-Thirds' Majority"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Marek Borowski, one of the leaders of the Democratic Left Alliance, may not be entirely wrong in saying that Lech Walesa's refusal to sign the 16 November tax law is political. However, the president supported this decision with economic arguments that have been mentioned by opposition politicians and economists for some time now. They have been talking about the state's rigid fiscal policy and the increasing redistributional character of the GNP. Thus, it is not true that the president wants to irritate the governing coalition against all rational arguments.

It is almost certain that we will witness a similar situation in two months, when the Sejm passes next year's budget law. The budget, of course, may be criticized from many viewpoints, and the coalition will have trouble with its own deputies, as well, before it passes the law. It is very likely that the president will veto the law, and many substantive arguments in favor of rejecting the budget were already submitted during the debate in the Sejm.

Thus, the coalition will probably face a similar problem in February and will have to seek support outside. In addition, it cannot be 100-percent certain how its deputies will act. Its leaders can hope that things will turn out well in February—the president will sign the law or the coalition will collect two-thirds of the votes required to override the veto. They can also already start talks (with the Union of Labor, for instance) on a budget that could be supported by a party from outside the coalition.

However, the presidential veto revealed a far more important problem. Marek Borowski puts under question the principle of rejecting vetoes by a two-thirds' majority. He argues that it is impossible to govern the country if this principle is in effect. This is a dangerous signal. It means an attempt to undermine the principle that says that really difficult, debatable, and controversial decisions require more than just the ordinary majority of votes. This is why this principle has been written into the Constitution. Those in power cannot change everything as they like; they must try to talk with the opposition, unless they have an overwhelming majority in the Sejm, which is not very likely right now.

Daily Views UW's Democratic Forum Meeting

WS2911120194 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 28 Nov 94 p 2

[Article by Malgorzata Subotic: "Freedom Union's Democratic Forum Established; Mazowiecki Cautions Against Split"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 26 November, the activists of the "left wing" of the Freedom Union [UW] set up the Democratic Forum [FD]. "I have come here to warn you against the threat of splitting UW," UW Chairman Tadeusz Mazowiecki told them. "We have established this organization because most of us felt that we are not very welcome in this party," Wladyslaw Frasyniuk said at the end of the meeting. Contrary to rumors spread before the meeting, FD members (approximately 300 persons) did not field Jacek Kuron as their candidate for president. In line with the information we obtained, Kuron himself does not want to be their candidate. The FD must yet be approved by the UW Council.

To Unite Through Division

"If someone tells us that he wants to split UW, he either lies on purpose or does not understand anything at all." This opinion was presented by Zofia Kuratowska, chairperson of the former socioliberal faction within UW. Mazowiecki decided that he is probably one of the members of that faction because he is afraid of splitting UW. "I have come here to caution you against this." He accused the FD activists, Kuratowska and Frasyniuk, of "depreciating their own party" in press statements. "This is not a language of dialogue; it is a language in which we are losing respect for each other." In line with Mazowiecki's diagnosis, personal disputes "are characterized by a fatal logic." It is easy to cross the line after which it is impossible to stop. After expressing his warning, the UW chairman left the session.

Kuratowska declared that the FD has been established to ensure that the chances of maintaining the party's unity are 99.9 percent. Earlier, this summer, in interviews in the press, she estimated these chances at 40 percent. "Mr. Mazowiecki should not think that those who are in the FD will defect from the party. Whoever wants to defect can defect," stated Marek Edelman.

The UW chairman's speech had some effect on the delegates. Only toward the end of the session did emotions overcome them. The delegates started to wonder whether Mazowiecki should receive a letter expressing "great sorrow" that he did not want to listen to what his party members had to say.

What Do You Do With a Letter?

"You send a letter, not approve it," Frasyniuk tried to persuade the FD founders "not to approve" the letter. "Mazowiecki's behavior is a political fact, and we cannot bury our heads in the sand or let the problem slowly disappear, as is usually done in UW," others, including Kuratowska, said. Finally, the letter was "approved."

Even though, off the record, the delegates expressed very critical opinions about Mazowiecki's leadership ("he is killing the party"), in official discussions the statements were far more balanced. An exception was a statement by Bogdan Klich from Krakow, who said that Leszek

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Balcerowicz would make a good candidate for UW leader because Mazowiecki has already played the role of a political "clip" [spinacz].

Only informal discussions suggested what the FD founders really wanted to achieve. Frasyniuk: "Mazowiecki took the train going in the Christian-right direction, and he is afraid that a group may be formed that will not want to go in the same direction." Andrzej Celinski: "UW is chasing its tail, and it has lost its ability to be creative. For many people in the leadership, just as for Jaroslaw Kaczynski's Center Accord, a game is everything."

Kuron Did Not Anoint Faction

In line with its programmatic declaration, the FD is supposed to be an "intraparty opinion-making group that aims to intensify UW activities and to strengthen its position in society." The FD supported "free enterprise, an active social policy." It disapproved of "all forms of discrimination."

FD activists, as Frasyniuk himself put it, feel they were relegated to the margin of UW after the unification congress. At that time, apart from Frasyniuk, no representative of the left wing of the former Democratic Union was elected to the leadership of the party. Thus, the establishment of the FD is an attempt to regain the lost position before the party's congress, scheduled for April, rather than a deliberate splitting of the party. However, as Mazowiecki warned, it is easy to cross the line after which there is no possibility of turning back. There is only the split.

The FD position would be far stronger if the faction had been supported by Jacek Kuron. However, Kuron does not feel like being a presidential candidate of a minor faction in one of many parties because then his chances in the elections would look really bleak. Thus, the FD activists do not have real power; they cannot really strengthen their position either within UW or outside it—after a possible split.

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Iliescu Statement Prior to WEU Session

AU2811181394 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] This afternoon Romanian President Ion Iliescu left the country for Paris where he is to attend the Western European Union [WEU] parliamentary assembly session.

President Iliescu made the following statement to the press at Otopeni Airport:

[Begin recording] My attending the WEU parliamentary assembly session is, in a way, a premiere. For the first time ever the head of a Central European country is to attend that forum.

After the recent Strasbourg conference of the Council of Europe parliamentary assembly, this will be the second significant political event consecrating the process of Romania's integration within European structures and institutions.

The WEU is, as they say, the European arm of NATO, a military and security organization of the European Union, and by the end of this year Romania will become an associate member of the latter. We signed the association accord a year ago and with the ratification of that accord by all 12 EU member states, the most recent being Belgium, we have concluded the entire process of ratification. Thus, as of 1 January 1995 Romania will be accorded the status of associate member of the EU, the former Common Market.

We are attending the WEU parliamentary assembly session in our capacity as associate member of the WEU, with which we have, in fact, close relations. As is known, not long ago the council of that body held a meeting in Bucharest; they opened a WEU information center. Romania is actively cooperating with the representatives of the WEU in monitoring the Danube River embargo. So, there is a climate of close cooperation and interest in consolidating such relations, and consecrating our consequent political orientation following the [December 1989] revolution, integrating Romania within various European structures.

We will try to turn our presence in Paris to good account also by meeting with important political personalities, with President Francois Mitterrand, with Mr. Philippe Seguin, president of the French National Assembly, who recently visited Bucharest, and with the Mayor of Paris Jacques Chirac.

Tomorrow evening we will attend a meeting organized by the French Institute for Foreign Relations where I will make a speech on Romania and Europe, on Europe as seen by Romania and Bucharest, followed by a working dinner organized by the aforementioned institute. I will also have the opportunity to meet with representatives of the mass media, that is, French television, radio, and press. [end recording]

Also at Otopeni airport, answering a question related to the Iliescu's postponement of his so-called parliamentary hearing investigating the 1989 December events, President Iliescu stressed that actually this would not have been an audition of the head of the state, but rather a meeting with the members of that panel, which had been postponed several times before owing solely to technical reasons. President Iliescu also pointed out that he refused to attend that meeting this time because information has been leaked to the press and official documents have been stolen, and therefore he will continue refusing until the situation is cleared up.

Hungarian Minority Dissatisfied With Basic Treaty

LD2811210394 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [HDUR] is dissatisfied with both Romania and Hungary. Tibor Bogdan reports from Bucharest.

[Bogdan] According to the HDUR's executive presidium, the stand by neither Bucharest nor Budapest can be considered satisfactory regarding minority rights, which are to be laid down in the bilateral political basic treaty. They pointed that out at their latest meeting. In a statement, they say that the Romanian side's proposal is incomplete because it still does not contain principles and solutions that, according to the HDUR, are indispensable to a satisfactory settlement of the minority issue and without which the basic treaty cannot achieve its goal.

The statement of the HDUR's executive presidium also says that Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu has recently told the leaders of Hungarians in Romania that the Hungarian side has drawn up a detailed draft on the exact regulation of the minority issue. However, the HDUR's executive presidium holds that the Hungarian proposal is not complete either. The text of a minority agreement, which is regarded as an integral part of the treaty, is missing from it, the HDUR's executive presidium says in its statement.

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Karadzic Proposes 'Definitive Peace Agreement'

LD2811173794 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, has sent a letter to UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali in which he proposes that a definitive peace agreement for the former Bosnia-Herzegovina be signed, with UN mediation, in seven to ten days' time in Geneva.

Our offer is a radical solution—immediate peace and the signing of a final peace agreement that would not prejudice territorial and political aspects, President Karadzic's letter stresses. He also says this is the best possible solution for both sides—both the Serb and the Muslim side. In his letter to Butrus-Ghali the president of the Srpska republic stresses that the Serb proposal for a definitive peace agreement to be concluded in seven to ten days' time in Geneva shows that the Serbs are not interested in delaying the peace process or in partial solutions.

I believe that you have received and studied the report on the meeting held at Sarajevo airport on 25 November between the Serb and Muslim sides under UN auspices. At this meeting the Muslims requested a three-month cessation of hostilities while the Serb side proposed a preliminary agreement on an immediate cease-fire, which also implies an immediate cease-fire, the letter recalls [as heard].

The president of the Srpska republic points out that the Muslims failed to reply to the Serb offer, and he assesses that Muslim tactics were oriented toward achieving a pause at a time when, in military terms, they are in a bad position. It is evident that they really do not want peace but a pause, so that they might regroup, rearm, and renew their attacks.

The most dangerous aspect of the Muslim offer lies in the fact that it would create a situation of neither war nor peace and in practice this would inevitably lead to the renewal of hostilities, Dr. Radovan Karadzic warned. Such an outcome is certainly not one that the United Nations is working for, and so I am asking you to understand that any alternative to the Serb offer could be catastrophic, the letter concludes.

U.S. May Consider Serbian 'Confederation'

AU2911102294 Paris AFP in English 1008 GMT 29 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Nov 29 (AFP)—Envoys of the five-nation Contact Group were expected in Sarajevo Tuesday to attempt to save the Bosnian peace plan, ahead of a visit by UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali.

A spokeswoman of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) civil affairs office here said the group were on their way from Zagreb and were due to arrive shortly before midday. Authorities at Sarajevo airport, which has been closed for more than a week, could not confirm that the group would land at the announced time.

A spokesman for the Bosnian Presidency, confirming that the group was on its way, said they would meet President Alija Izetbegovic, Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, and Vice President Ejup Ganic.

The group were expected to travel also to Pale for talks with the Bosnian Serb leadership.

The visit precedes a meeting of the international Contact Group of Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States at the level of foreign ministers in Brussels on Friday, parallel to a meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to discuss the Bosnian crisis.

Butrus-Ghali, whose visit here was announced late Monday in New York, arrives amid a flurry of criticism of the UN role in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the Bosnian Government accusing it of refusing to authorise NATO to launch military action to enforce UN resolutions.

The UN chief last visited Sarajevo on December 31, 1992.

Officials in Washington said Monday that the United States might consider the possibility of a Bosnian Serb confederation with rump Yugoslavia, similar to that of the Bosnian Croat-Moslem federation with Croatia, on condition that the separatist Serbs recognise Bosnia's territorial integrity.

The situation in Bihac was calm overnight Monday, with small-arms fire and two detonations heard in the Serb-held village of Sokolac, southeast of Bihac town which Serb forces, pressing in from three sides, are poised to overrun.

UN Protection Force spokesman Lt.-Col. Herve Gourmelon said that small-arms fire was reported also from Velika Kladusa, in the north of the Bihac pocket, where government forces are virtually surrounded by Serb-backed Moslems loyal to dissident businessman Fikret Abdic.

Canada Demands Release of Troops Held by Serbs

LD2811214294 Montreal Radio Canada International in English 2100 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Canadian military officials say the Bosnian Serbs must free 55 Canadian peacekeepers. They say the Serbs' offer to allow the detained Canadian soldiers to return to their base and be replaced by other Canadian peacekeepers is unacceptable.

The Bosnian Serbs continue to restrict the movements of 55 Canadians in Ilijas, near Visoko. Over the weekend the Serbs also attacked a Canadian camp at Visoko with mortars. The shelling took place before dawn and there were no injuries in the Canadian camp.

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Rifkind Responds to Senator Dole's Criticism

MS2911103194 London BBC Television Network in English 1900 GMT 28 Nov 94

[Interview with British Defense Secretary Malcolm Rifkind by presenter Kirsty Wark on 28 Nov in London; from the "Channel Four" newscast—recorded]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [Wark] Earlier I spoke to the Defense Secretary Malcolm Rifkind. I put to him Senator Dole's comment that Britain and France, in particular Britain, had blocked plans for more aggressive use of NATO airpower to stop the Serb advance into the UN safe area of Bihac.

[Rifkind] Well, I'm not sure that either London or Paris would agree with that assessment. The crucial point that I think has to be emphasized is that Britain, France, and many other countries have large numbers of troops on the ground in Bosnia carrying out a crucial task that has been well recognized by the Bosnian Government as well as by the U.S. Government, and therefore I think congressmen are perhaps not as well informed in this matter as they should be.

[Wark] And yet Bob Dole says the troops are not actually serving any useful purpose?

[Rifkind] Well, that's not the view of his own government and it's not the view of the Bosnian Government, because in both cases a very clear and unambiguous request was made to the United Nations to continue in Bosnia. They are very anxious that they should remain because they recognize that not only are thousands of lives being saved, but one can only speculate as to what will be the impact in Sarajevo or Gorazde or elsewhere if the United Nations was to pull out.

[Wark] But NATO and the UN both vow to save Bihac; clearly that's not happening.

[Rifkind] I think there is always a danger of rhetoric on these occasions and being too grandiose, to be justified by what is possible. I very much agreed with the U.S. Defense Secretary Bill Perry last night, who made it clear that airpower by itself cannot deliver peace on the ground, and he quite rightly said that to enforce peace requires over 100,000 troops. Now there only are 40,000 troops there; to have anything like that number would require a major American contribution on the ground—I was pleased that the American Government recognizes and supports that fact, and that is a factor that we can't ignore.

[Wark] But do you think Senator Dole is playing to a domestic audience or do you think he is playing—looking towards your meeting on Wednesday?

[Rifkind] It's not for me to question his motives; I am sure he wants to see peace in Bosnia, as do the rest of us. I think what is very important is that any judgments expressed, whether by congressmen or by others, should be based on an understanding on what is actually happening in Bosnia, the [word indistinct] on the ground and perhaps visiting Bosnia—I mean that would make a big difference.

[Wark] You think Bob Dole should go to Bosnia?

[Rifkind] I think all congressmen who wish to express strong and unqualified views as to what should happen would find it worthwhile to visit Bosnia to see what the United Nations is doing, have explained to them and hear very carefully what would happen if the United Nations simply pulled out. They couldn't lose out by going, and if you express opinions without going then they are not likely to be as firmly based.

[Wark] But if UN troops are [words indistinct] being taken hostage, surely we are reaching the point where it's not safe to have UN troops on the ground?

[Rifkind] I think we might be approaching that stage. Clearly if the United Nations troops in Bosnia were to be seen as targets by the Bosnian Serbs or Croats or Muslims, not as friends assisting in a way that help deal with humanitarian problems but as legitimate targets, and if their physical safety was endangered, then of course they would have to be withdrawn, and that would be the view of the United Nations as a whole.

[Wark] And what would that mean for the three million people that depend on aid convoys?

[Rifkind] It would be extremely bad news indeed and I think that is why the British Government does not wish to withdraw from Bosnia. We would like to remain there, we believe that British and other UN forces are doing a very viable and important work, but at the end of the day the United Nations can only stay if it's able to carry out its mandate and if it can do so without unacceptable risks to its own soldiers. If these two criteria are not met then UN withdrawal would become inevitable, and those who [word indistinct] that inevitable would have a very difficult consideration on their consciences.

Turkey's Soysal: Akashi Reports 'Unreliable'

AU2811204894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic late last night held a telephone conversation with Turkish Foreign Minister Muntaz Soysal. Mr. Soysal briefed the prime minister that he had just ended consultations on behalf of the Turkish president and prime minister with Egyptian President Mubarak, Jordanian King Husayn, Moroccan King Hassan, the Pakistani prime minister, and the Bangladeshi president. They agreed that all these statesmen should immediately contact UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali to demand that the UN obstruction of effective NATO action to defend the UN safe havens in Bosnia-Herzegovina be stopped.

Turkish Minister Soysal personally spoke about this problem to Butrus-Ghali, who is currently visiting Rabat. Minister Soysal asked Prime Minister Silajdzic to provide him with information on the situation in the Bihac region,

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taking the view that Akashi's reports are unreliable, because they are underestimating the difficulties and dangers to which the people in Bihac are exposed.

Minister Soysal stressed that the Islamic countries' Contact Group for Bosnia-Herzegovina has asked the Contact Group of the four Western countries and Russia to harmonize their actions and that the representatives of both contact groups participate in the work of both groups all the time.

Serbs Ease Blockade of UN Troops Near Sarajevo

AU2911121294 Paris AFP in English 1135 GMT 29 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Nov 29 (AFP)—Serbs eased Tuesday a blockade of 270 UN troops imposed last week at weapons-collection points round Sarajevo, UN sources said.

The Serbs made a partial withdrawal from from one of the points, the source said, adding: "There are now no longer any Serb guards outside the UN post at Poljine telling our troops not to move."

However the Serb gunners who normally carry out maintenance on the guns and who live locally remain nearby, he said.

However the blockaded troops have not been told they can leave the post north of Sarajevo.

Earlier he said the Serbs had withdrawn from another post, at Bare near Sarajevo, but later revised his assessment.

An official UN spokesman said there had been no change in the situation regarding the blockaded troops, though the situation was "less tense."

The Serbs blockaded the mostly French, Ukrainian and Russian soldiers last week in the wake of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation airstrikes against their anti-aircraft missile batteries in the northwest of the country last Wednesday.

The Serbs are also holding some 55 Canadians near Visoko, northwest of Sarajevo.

In eastern Bosnia, 164 UN Dutch and British troops in a convoy were stopped in Serb-controlled territory Saturday and are being held by Serb forces despite having been given permission beforehand to proceed.

Heavy Weapons Fired in Exclusion Zone

AU2811210394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] On the Sarajevo front this afternoon, the [Serbian] aggressor attacked Hrasno Brdo with antiaircraft machine gun from the direction of Vrace. Our defenders' lines were also attacked with grenades, antiaircraft machine guns, and small arms. The enemy also fired five shells from a recoilless gun at our defense lines in Kamenolom and Gajevo. It then targeted Most, Donji Kotorac, and Butmir from Gavrica Brdo with an antiaircraft machine gun. Hrasnica and the Igman road were also subjected to enemy antiaircraft gunfire and antiaircraft machine-gun fire.

On the Visoko front, the aggressor fired at the Vitex region and the Ciglane junction with mortars on Djurino Brdo and with a multiple rocket launcher from the Ilijas steel works, which is well inside the Sarajevo exclusion zone. One howitzer shell fired from the aggressor's positions landed in the town. Several other projectiles landed on Bosnia-Herzegovina Army positions in Prijeko. [passage omitted]

Presidency Urges Airdrops for Bihac, Srebrenica

AU2811200094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] At its session today, the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina discussed the increasingly grave humanitarian situation in the country, and concluded that the humanitarian situation throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina is becoming worse every day, that it has reached the critical point in Bihac and Srebrenica, and that this situation is the result of the drastic drop in the efficiency of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] brought about by the impermissible concessions to the [Serbian] aggressor's constant blackmail.

The Presidency therefore demands that food and medicines be immediately supplied to the endangered residents of Bihac and Srebrenica through airdrop actions, as this is the only way to stop the humanitarian catastrophe that is in sight, and that UNPROFOR reexamine its working methods, bearing in mind that the delivery of humanitarian aid to the endangered regions is its primary task, and that the fulfillment of this has recently been completely unsatisfactorily.

Serbian Attack on Bihac Continues 29 Nov

AU2911115594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 29 Nov 94

[Muhamed Mulic report from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Since the early morning hours, the aggressor has continued a fierce offensive on the protected zone of Bihac which is exposed to intensive shelling from all sides, and particularly from the UN-protected zones in the so-called Serbian Krajina. Along with long-range artillery and tanks, the enemy is mostly using mortars and is acting with infantry and antiaircraft weapons on the town itself [passage indistinct] near the town hospital, [word indistinct] (?shower) the [word indistinct] of the hospital buildings and some 2,200 wounded and ill people are in a very difficult position who [words indistinct]. (?The hospital) is left without medicines, first aid kits, and food. No aid is coming from the world and there are more and more wounded by the

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day. The number of refugees is increasing by the hour and the problem of their accommodation and food is impossible to solve at the moment. Humanitarian relief is also not coming and UNHCR warehouses have long been empty. [passage omitted]

Contact Group Calls For Cessation of Hostilities

AU2811183694 Paris AFP in English 1825 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Paris, Nov 28 (AFP)—The contact group on Bosnia demanded Monday [28 November] an immediate end to fighting in the Serb-besieged, UN-declared "safe area" of Bihac, but deep divisions among the five have raised serious questions about the future of the UN and NATO missions in ex-Yugoslavia. [passage omitted]

A communique released here by the contact group, comprising the United States, Russia, France, Britain and Germany, said it was "united in its demand for an immediate ceasefire in Bihac and the cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina." [passage omitted]

Bihac Mayor Says Surrender Not Option

AU2911095794 Munich ARD Television Network in German 2130 GMT 28 Nov 94

[Telephone interview with Bihac Mayor Hamdija Kabiljagic by Sabine Christiansen in Hamburg on 28 November—recorded, in German]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Christiansen] Today, we succeeded in establishing a telephone line with Bihac through various channels. The mayor of Bihac, Madija Kabiljagic, answered our questions.

[Kabiljagic] People are very afraid. Dramatic scenes are taking place. We will again be facing heavy attacks. New Serbian war materiel is arriving from Velika Kladusa. The Serbs continue to attack the town. The only possibility that people see is to defend themselves in the town. It would be an even higher risk for them to leave the town.

[Christiansen] What about the supply of the population in Bihac with water, electricity, and food?

[Kabiljagic] There is no water, electricity, or food. The UNHCR and the International Red Cross have not done anything to ensure supplies. UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] has not implemented the resolutions that were adopted. It did not clear the roads to Bihac. Because of the lack of everything, the situation of the people is disastrous. People are drinking water from the river, which is partly poisoned. Above all, this is also a problem for the injured hospital patients who have to drink this kind of water.

[Christiansen] Is a surrender to save human lives out of the question?

[Kabiljagic] Surrender is not an alternative for the people in Bihac. The question does not arise for people here at the moment because they know of dozens of other towns that surrendered and were completely leveled. Everybody was killed there once the conquerors entered the town, or they were put in concentration camps. Thus, surrender would mean nothing but death. For this reason, this possibility, the option, does not exist for people.

UN Reports War-Wounded Treated 'Out of Doors'

AU2811211094 Paris AFP in English 2053 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Nov 28 (AFP)—The population of Bihac has been "terrorised" by the Serb onslaught against the embattled Bosnian town but feels powerless to flee, a UN aid spokesman said here Monday [28 November].

Bosnian and Croatian Serb attackers have not entirely surrounded the town, said Peter Kessler, of the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

But the population "does not want to leave the town because it thinks it has nowhere else (in the Bihac enclave) to take refuge," he told AFP.

He was quoting testimony from Monique Tuffeli, a UNHCR worker in the enclave who entered Bihac town Monday.

"The situation hasn't changed much for several days," he said, adding that Tuffeli had gone to Bihac hospital less than one kilometre (0.6 miles) from Serb positions and where 1,600 war wounded were being treated in "critical" conditions out of doors.

Earlier Monday the doctor of the embattled hospital, Bekir Tatlic, said in a telephone link to Germany that 64 patients had been admitted during the day.

He said there were about 2,000 people in the 700-bed establishment and that shells were landing 20-25 metres (yards) from the building.

The doctor also complained that humanitarian organisations had withdrawn from Bihac, leaving the hospital without supplies or equipment.

Kessler added that the situation was also "extremely critical" in Velika Kladusa, a town in the north of the enclave besieged by renegade Moslem forces under dissident strongman Fikret Abdic.

Citing UNHCR personnel in Velika Kladusa, he said the town had been without water for two weeks and, due to the Moslem-on-Moslem fighting, "it has been impossible to pick up the wounded and the dead."

Croats Call For Preventing 'Catastrophe' at Bihac

LD2811191194 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Chamber of Deputies of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna has called on the international community to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Bihac from taking place. Zdenko Vranjes reporting:

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[Vranjes] Following today's debate on the situation in the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation, the deputies expressed, in their conclusions, solidarity with the population of Bihac and support for their resistance to the aggressor force of the so-called Srpska republic, rebel Serbs from the Republic of Croatia, and their collaborators. In addition to this, their conclusions also demand that the international community speed up the search for a solution to the crisis in this area.

Speaking at the beginning of today's session, Jadranko Prlic, prime minister of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, said that this situation in Bihac might bring about completely new political solutions. Anticipating that the Contact Group might soon come up with the possibility of confederal links beteen the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia and expressing disagreement with this, Prlic said there could be no equals sign between confederation of the Bosnian Serbs with Serbia on the one hand and confederation between the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation with Croatia on the other.

In their conclusions the deputies stress the significance of consolidating the legal system and institutions of Herceg-Bosna in the further process of solving the political crisis. The need is also stressed for the further development of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation and its confederation with the Republic of Croatia.

Tonight, in the second part of the session, the deputies are discussing documents that will be placed on the agenda for the next session of the federal constitutional assembly scheduled for 12 December. At this session the deputies are expected to insist on extending the mandate of Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation, by another six months.

Izetbegovic Urges Bihac To Continue Struggle

AU2811194094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, today sent a letter of support to the courageous people of the Bosnian Krajina concerning the grave situation in the Bihac region caused by the brutal Serb-Montenegrin aggression and the trials of the people in that region, who are fighting for their survival and human dignity. The letter reads:

Dear citizens of Krajina, courageous people of the Bosnian Krajina, our people have been breathlessly following your courageous struggle for life and freedom for 25 days. The enemy from the east and west sides have joined forces with the traitors. You must know that you are not alone in this unjust struggle. We are doing everything to help you. The enemy will be defeated, and we will try the criminals and traitors.

Our army, of which you are an integral part, is active on all fronts in order to make it easier for you and help you. It is trying to tie down considerable enemy forces on other parts of the front and in this way help your resistance. These efforts are proving successful to a great extent.

The enemy is (?spreading) their poisonous propaganda. They are talking about victories even when they are losing battles, and when they suffer defeat they ask us to surrender. Do not listen to the enemy, do not fall for their stories that are designed to cause confusion in our ranks and to break our will to resist them.

Similarly, do not expect much from the world. Our best men are in charge of these contacts. They are doing their jobs well and tirelessly, but our fate is being solved in Bosnia, and it primarily depends on ourselves. Let us therefore look to ourselves and close ranks; let us support our courageous soldiers and the Command of the 5th Corps everywhere. Let us preserve our dignity when we are inflicting as well as when we are receiving blows. Let every individual conscientiously carry out his duties, his part of the job, and with God's help, victory will be ours.

I repeat, you must know that you are not alone, the army is fighting with you, and our people are following your struggle with admiration and prayer.

This was stated in a letter of support that Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has sent to the courageous people of the Bosnian Krajina.

Abdic Urges Bihac To Join 'People's Defense'

LD2811172394 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Fikret Abdic has addressed the citizens of Bihac on Velkaton Radio, reminding them that Izetbegovic's regime has paid for all its stupidities so far with the lives of innocent citizens. We are no longer going to allow innocent people to be deceived by the Sarajevo regime. More than 1,000 killed and around 4,000 wounded—this is the consequence of the suffering of innocent people who were ruthlessly pushed into the hell of those who are carrying out the policy of death, Abdic said. He noted that the key to peace for the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina could be found in the autonomous province of western Bosnia.

Therefore, Abdic went on to say, in the name of the dignity of all those who have signed the democratic initiative for our better future, I am asking you finally to shake off the eastern shroud and the pattern of lies imposed on you by the Sarajevo regime and its branches in Bihac, embodied in the leadership of the Party of Democratic Action, the 5th Corps command, and the security services' center in Bihac.

I would again wish to remind you of the validity of the statement on permanent peace with the Serb and Croatian nations. I am calling on you to immediately join the forces of the People's Defense of the autonomous province of western Bosnia, because in that way

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you will evade the massacres which the 5th Corps command is preparing for you inside the town of Bihac, in order to use your misfortune to demand the continuation of NATO actions which will be also used for saving the criminal lives of their members, Fikret Abdic concluded in his address to the citizens of Bihac.

'Relentless' Barrage Kills 5 Civilians in Bihac

AU2811151694 Paris AFP in English 1459 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Zagreb, Nov 28 (AFP)—Five civilians were killed and more than 20 seriously wounded Monday [28 November] by a relentless Serb artillery barrage against besieged Bihac town, the mainly Moslem Bosnian Army said here in a statement.

The communique, released by the BIHAC PRESS AGENCY (BPA), said Serb forces had fired "more than 100 projectiles of various calibres" on the northwestern Bosnian town Monday morning. It gave no other details on the casualties.

A UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) spokesman said he was unable to confirm the report. [passage omitted]

UNPROFOR Contradicts Report

AU2811180294 Paris AFP in English 1743 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Zagreb, Nov 28 (AFP)—One person was killed Monday [28 November] when two shells fell on the besieged northwest Bosnian town of Bihac, the UN Protection Force said, contradicting Bosnian Army reports of five civilians killed and more than 20 wounded.

The UNPROFOR said two shells landed at about 0930 GMT north of the building housing the headquarters of the mainly Moslem army's 5th corps.

The building is located in the southwestern part of the town.

Earlier, the Bosnian army said in a statemen that five civilians were killed and more than 20 seriously wounded by a relentless Serb artillery barrage against Bihac town. [passage omitted]

Muslims Inflict 'Major Losses' Near Bihac

AU2811151094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serb aggressor has continued strong artillery and infantry attacks on the positions of the 5th Corps of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the villages in the Bihac region, especially from occupied parts of the Republic of Croatia. Our fighters have successfully repelled all these attacks and inflicted major losses on the aggressor.

The aggressor forces of the army of the so-called republic of Serbian Krajina and Fikret Abdic's paramilitaries have been routed and pushed out of the Bugari region. One aggressor tank was destroyed in the region of Vedro Polje, near Bihac.

On the Grabez Plateau, the aggressor has carried out several unsuccessful artillery-infantry attacks. All attacks between Male Kotine and Veliki (?Panez) near Bosanska Krupa have been repelled.

On the territory of the Velika Kladusa municipality, the aggressor forces have carried out several unsuccessful infantry attacks around the village of (?Rajinovac). The free part of that municipality is being subjected to constant artillery attacks from the direction of Meljinovac and Katinovac in the occupied part of the Republic of Croatia. In all these attacks, the aggressor has suffered significant losses in manpower and hardware. Seven dead aggressor soldiers were left lying on our side near Bosanska Krupa alone.

Serbs 'Fiercely Pounding' Gorazde District

AU2911122394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 29 Nov 94

[Correspondent report from Gorazde]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Words indistinct] fiercely pounding the Vitkovici District with antiaircraft machine guns, M-84 machine guns, and snipers. The district of (Zaster) and [name indistinct] have been exposed to intensive operations from antiaircraft machine guns and antiaircraft guns from Celopek and Crvene Stijene. M-84 machine guns and snipers are acting on (Obarak). All this has been happening before the eyes of the members of the UN peace forces who are only recording the further suffering of the Gorazde civilian population, although they themselves have been exposed to the dangers of chetnik activities.

According to what we learned from the (Mravnjak) local commune, since this morning the aggressor has been using antiaircraft machine guns from (Vitine) to pound the district of Potrkusa. We just received a report from the office of Gorazde District Executive Council Chairman Esad Ohranovic that the UNHCR convoy announced for today has been called off for reasons known to the chetniks alone. We have also learned that the chetniks have forbidden the evacuation of seriously ill and wounded civilians. [passage omitted]

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Defense Minister Susak Arrives in Washington

LD2811232694 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2300 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak has arrived on an official visit to the United States. During his two-day visit to Washington, Minister Susak will sign a memorandum on defense and military cooperation with William Perry, the U.S. defense secretary, and have talks with officials in the Defense Department, the State Department, and Congress.

Krajina Serbs Guarantee UNPROFOR Security

AU2811151994 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The main headquarters of the republic of Serbian Krajina army has announced that relations with UN representatives are in accordance with the working methods defined and the principles agreed upon. UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] members have no reason to feel threatened or to fear for their personal safety or that of the facilities and materials at their disposal, reads the statement.

The army of the republic of Serbian Krajina is acting in accordance with the stances of the republic of Serbian Krajina assembly, which obliges them to cooperate and maintain correct relations with UNPROFOR representatives and other international organizations. UN representatives are carrying out their duties in accordance with their mandate in the interest of achieving peace, that is, a peaceful solution to the conflict with Croatia. Obstruction and interference with the work of UN representatives is not in the interest of the Serbs in the republic of Serbian Krajina. Threatening their safety could threaten the safety of the citizens of the republic of Serbian Krajina, which no one wants, reads the statement of the main headquarters of the republic of Serbian Krajina army.

General: Army Ready To Recapture Serb-Held Areas

LD2811151294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1421 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb, 28 Nov (TANJUG)—The Croatian Army's Chief of the General Staff General Janko Bobetko said that "Croatia is facing the urgent task of regaining the occupied part of its territory because of its national unity and the situation in the state."

In an interview for the Zagreb weekly DANAS, Gen Bobetko pointed out that the Croatian army "is prepared for this task" and that "it will carry it out when it is politically assessed that the time is right both in Croatia and abroad."

Assessing the NATO attacks on Serb positions, Bobetko stressed that "the most important thing is that they have begun" and that NATO did not stop at "verbal threats" but "justified its existence with these attacks."

"We shall see what its next steps in the Bihac area will be but in any case it is of great importance, both politically and strategically, that it has attacked the Serbs at last," Bobetko said.

'Sabotage-Terrorist Group' Kills 3 Serb Soldiers

LD2811183594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1759 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Okucani, 28 Nov (TANJUG)—The West Slavonia Corps command of the Serb army of the republic of Serb Krajina has reported that this afternoon a sabotage-terrorist group of the Croatian army killed three members of the Serb army of Krajina in the area of Prasnik forest.

Two soldiers were shot dead at point-blank range, the command says in a statement. It also adds that this is not the first time Croatian terrorists have infiltrated this area.

The West Slavonia Corps command informed the UN Protection Force command for Sector West about the murders and demanded that the world public also be informed about them.

Diplomat on Croatia's Role in Bosnian Conflict

BR2911134994 Madrid ABC in Spanish 27 Nov 94 pp 42-43

[Interview with Croatian Ambassador Miomir Zuzul by Ramiro Villapadierna in Zagreb; date not given: "Zuzul: 'Only Forceful Vigilance by NATO Can Bring Peace to Bosnia'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"Croatia has the capacity to defend itself alone. If we were able to protect Croatia three years ago, we are sure that we can do so today." Miomir Zuzul, the Croatian ambassador to the Geneva Conference, will probably be the next foreign minister if Mate Granic takes over from sick Prime Minister Nikica Valentic. However, he tells ABC in this interview that Croatia's first aim is to put an end to the war, with the help of the international community "which is the only body with an effective mechanism that can achieve this," even though "it will never be at the cost of Croatian sovereignty."*

[Villapadierna] What were the terms of Croatia's recent agreement with NATO?

[Zuzul] The contents of the agreement were defined by the logic of both parties which is essentially how to stop Serbian aggression in general and especially in the so-called UN-protected areas. We also considered how to prevent some of the Croatian Serbs, over whom the state has no control, from taking part in a war that is clearly condemned by the Croatian state. The main question we are trying to resolve is how to act with the international

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community, which is the only body with an effective mechanism that can take these steps, without the war escalating and, at the same time, without affecting the sovereignty of the Croatian state. The agreement recognizes our sovereignty, it recognizes who the aggressor is and what is happening here, and it expresses the desire to put an end to the war and move toward a peaceful solution; only in this context was the agreement acceptable, and we accepted it.

[Villapadierna] What guarantees did Croatia obtain from NATO in the light of possible reprisals for such collaboration?

[Zuzul] We did not ask for special guarantees. Croatia went to the international community in search of a guarantee for peace, but if there were any violent reactions then we would be capable of protecting ourselves and we would count on the understanding and help of the international community. Any help that leads to peace, as long as the sovereignty of Croatia is respected, is welcome. If there were an attack by renegade Serbs (in Krajina) then there is no doubt that Croatia would react independently, as would any other country. However, Croatia does not want it to seem, under any pretext, as if it were using this provocation as an opportunity to find a solution by going to war again.

[Villapadierna] Does that mean that Croatia is capable of reacting alone? The British military attache in Belgrade, Edward Cowan, wrote recently that Croatia missed its chance to arm itself in time.

[Zuzul] This is not my speciality, but I believe what our president and our leaders say: Croatia is strong enough to protect itself. If we were able to defend ourselves three years ago, then most certainly we could do so even better today. However, in such a delicate situation we are trying to implement measures that avoid a fresh outbreak of war.

[Villapadierna] So the international community is still not allowing you the weapons you need to arm yourselves?

[Zuzul] The international community, whatever it says, is also capable of recognizing the limits between justice and injustice, and that includes here.

[Villapadierna] It seems that Kissinger's phrase "foreign policy is a national interest" makes a lot of sense here. Are the powers playing with NATO, the Blue Helmets, and does the arms embargo merely depend on their national interests?

[Zuzul] Even if there were the slightest interest for the various parties in delaying peace and justice, at least it is in the common interest for the war not to spread. It is in no country's interest for the war to escalate, except maybe in some parts of Serbia where even today they are still dreaming of a Greater Serbia. However, when we speak of the international community you do not have to be a psychic to see the dangerous scenario that would open up with a war not yet limited just to seizing protected areas, a self-proclaimed republic, or a whole state. I believe that the world is trying to find a peaceful solution, but there are serious disadvantages that have to be taken into account: It is impossible to find an absolute consensus for a political solution and, more important still, before we did not have an effective mechanism for bringing about peace. Now NATO is our most effective mechanism and I am convinced that if NATO remains here it will have a positive effect.

[Villapadierna] Such delicate nuances do not appear to be dampening the ardor of breakaway Serbs.

[Zuzul] A NATO reprisal always has some kind of military or political effect. Whenever strong action is taken then the effect is considerable. In this way we could assume that this process will accelerate in a firm and constant way.

[Villapadierna] Is the seizing of Cazinska Krajina the last step toward a Greater Serbia?

[Zuzul] Events in Cazin Krajina are just a fresh demonstration of Serbian brute force. Even if they manage, in this way, to form a small, unified Greater Serbia, that would just be an illusion of Greater Serbia. Given this latest step, the firm decision of the Croatian Government to recuperate all its territory can only be stimulated as a result of such action. Thus the strategic importance of the tragedy in Bihac is not especially important in the long term for the pan-Serbian plan.

[Villapadierna] But in the long term, everyone will be dead. The apparent influx of new weapons from Russia for the Serbian rebels in occupied Croatia suggests that we cannot think in the very long term.

[Zuzul] We know about the Russian weapons that are arriving. This is the problem I was talking about, the horrible scenario that would come about if the war escalated. This is one more reason to find the path to peace as soon as possible.

[Villapadierna] Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev continues to insist that it was the Bosnians themselves who provoked the Serbs.

[Zuzul] There is nothing new in politics. What is new is that, thanks to the NATO presence, the world has found a way of bringing the aggressor to the negotiating table. The only question is knowing to what extent the world is prepared to persevere to obtain and enforce peace.

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Gligorov Asks Crvenkovski To Form Government

AU2811160294 Skopje MIC in English 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The President of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] Kiro Gligorov, on the basis of Article 84, first line, and in accordance with Article 90, Item 1, of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, and the proposal of the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia [SDAM], and following the conducted consultations with the leaderships of the political parties represented in the new Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia, appointed, on Friday [28 November], Branko Crvenkovski, president of SDAM and present prime minister, mandator for the composition of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia.

The president has also informed the speaker of the parliament of this decision.

Commentary on Relations With U.S., Greece

AU2911112694 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 26 Nov 94 p 13

[Commentary by Zoran Andonovski: "Maximum Option"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The circle is closing. There are some announcements from New York and Washington that, allegedly, the next meeting between the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] foreign minister and UN mediator Cyrus Vance will be the last one. Everybody is in a hurry now. We (Macedonia) are on the other side—we are not in a hurry. When Macedonia was in a hurry, when recognition was of vital importance for Macedonia at the beginning of independence, everybody was telling us to wait. Now, the matters stand as follows: Papandreou believes that with this or that finalization of the dispute (even as a "new...") he will be able to provide himself with a visa for president of the country. There are some signals coming from Athens that Andreas never leaves anything to fate, and that he has even made an agreement with the opposition according to which it will not criticize and attack him a lot if he accepts a compromise with Macedonia. Apparently Papandreou has all the matters settled in Greece, all he has to do now is persuade the "other side." His missionaries have arrived in Skopje. Now, Athens is doing what Macedonia used to do there years ago—it is even asking for a secret meeting with Macedonian representatives.

Not only Papandreou, but also Washington is in a hurry now and it cannot understand why Macedonia, or if you wish, Gligorov, does not accept the "deal" that, according to Western standards and logic, seems favorable for the Macedonian side. Namely, the country that was denied even the letter "M" in its name, now that it has its name with the suffix "new" on a plate, all of a sudden wants more!

However, perhaps Macedonia must look for its chance and get the maximum in this world's hurry to get rid of an irrational problem. Nevertheless, what is this maximum and how can it be defined? How much is it possible, for instance, to expect that Macedonia will "get it all?" Is it realistic and possible to expect that the country will solve the misunderstanding with its neighbor without touching the name, flag, and constitution?

The words spoken in September by Bill Clinton's special envoy in the dispute—Matthew Niemitz—that there will be "give and take" are probably still current. Looking in the local context, our maximum is certainly defined in the consistent stance that each state has an inalienable right to choose its name itself, that it must not be a subject of bargaining, and that it is necessary to sit down and talk about this. However, in spite of this (finally) somewhat loosely defined stance it should not be interpreted as opening possibilities for concessions or compromises, but simply as a possibility for having a dialogue with the other side in order to be persuaded and to see for itself that its requests are irrational. Greece has probably already understood that a possible unfavorable outcome of the whole adventure, or figuratively speaking, the humiliation of any of the sides will certainly not lead to stable good neighborly relations. The "defeat" of the one will definitely lead to freezing relations with a possibility for another dispute in the future. It is, therefore, not logical, for instance, to expect friendship and good will from Macedonia if it is by any means forced to do something under pressure, something that will touch its national and state interests, and finally, something that is against the will of its people.

In spite of its clearly expressed stance on the name and state symbols, Macedonia must define its last front line of defense, or—although it is not the best term, of concession. Although it can sound very unpopular, we must bear in mind our last possible option. It was something that President Gligorov accurately stated upon his return from Geneva, saying that "it is the right of our people to promote its constitutional name on the international plan and thus solve this question." If we are allowed to interpret his words, they can give a hint of the limits of the "last front line of defense" that leave no possibilities for a retreat or "concessions" at least in what Macedonia will use "at home" and in its communications with the world.

The December, or January, deadline that was pointed out at the beginning of the autumn as the time frame within which it is possible, and for some necessary, to reach a compromise, judging by all appearances looks as if it is going to be missed. We shall not be admitted to the CSCE because Greece will give its veto. The United States will not establish diplomatic relations and it will not support us in the "Partnership for Peace" because we are not a member of the CSCE and because the dispute with Greece is not resolved, and Greece will be able to continue on its own way because of the fact that we are

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not a member of the CSCE, because we do not have diplomatic relations with the world's superpower, and because we are among the few that have not joined the NATO waiting room, called "Partnership for Peace."

Editorial on 'Irrational' Greek Policy on Corn

AU2511194294 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 23 Nov 94 p 2

[Editorial by D. Culev: "U.S. Corn Also Imperils Hellinism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently, Greece again stood to protect its national interests, which, this time, are "imperiled" by the 45,000 metric tons of corn that have to pass across its territory. The one-year corn plant, produced in the United States and intended for Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], is in sudden danger and can destroy the efforts of many years in an attempt to deny and disable the statehood of the northern neighbor. The question of whether to let the corn pass or not to let it pass is reaching the level of Hamlet's dilemma for the present authorities, but also for the opposition, which has started a profound scholar discussion and a precise calculation, trying to discern the political background to the corn and to anticipate the possible consequences of a possible concession to Macedonia....

It might sound a little ironic, but there can be no other comments on the latest lesson for Athens's political circles, as well as the dust that was raised just after the arrival of the cargo for Macedonia at the port of Salonika. In a relatively short period of time, a dozen nonsenses were thrown out that seriously indicate the destabilized of the reasoning ability of the professional caretakers in the Greek capital, who, even in the most banal situations, paranoically discover a plot or a threat to Hellenism. They have defined the corn as "food in a broader sense." The counter argument, that "if fish is called meat, it does not mean that it has really become so," proves how low the irrational Greek policy has fallen in relation to Macedonia. It is impossible to find one single logical or reasonable explanation—except, of course, a political one—why they would prevent the humanitarian aid reaching Macedonia. This "case" is almost identical to past cases, when car registrations and mail stamps were seen as threats and when sports matches involving Macedonian teams were regularly labelled provocations.

The present debate in Greece—in which the cabinet is trying to play the role of a "humane society" that does not mind the corn for Macedonia crossing Greek territory, contrary to the opposition that is worriedly indicating a violation of the embargo—is nothing but a quasi-political game following a naive scenario—it is perfectly clear that they share the same opinion when concessions to Macedonia are at stake. The background to this is the open intention of both sides to create a "case" that will be used to maintain nationalist tension in the country and to indicate to the international community the problems that Greece is facing because of the unsolved dispute with its northern neighbor, in which the guilty party is known in advance.

However, the latest case—which could easily find a place in Ripley's "Believe It Or Not"—carries a ray of hope that, among the Greek politicians, an awareness that the nonsensical embargo, which has caused more damage to Greece than to the side it was imposed on, is shyly emerging. Alongside this there is the growing awareness that Greece, although it sees itself as the regional superpower, is not as powerful as it tries to appear and that all the obstacles it has placed before Macedonia can be seen as petty malice and oversized gossip against the neighbor. This will probably also be understood by those circles in Europe and the world that have, so far, supported Greece, either actively or passively. If it does not become crystal clear to these circles that there is no connection between the "corn plants and national interests," then the problem is not in Greece, but in those who tolerate its behavior.

Foreign Trade Deficit Increases 1,200 Percent

AU2811175694 Skopje MIC in English 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The deficit in Macedonia's [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] foreign trade activities, in the first six months of this year, is estimated at $165 million, which is 1,200 percent more than last year. This is expected to have a reflection on the other economic indicators in the country, in view of the fact that 80 percent of Macedonia's GDP is realized through foreign trade exchange.

Exports in the first six months of this year reached $501 million, a 4 percent drop. The drop in exports is even more drastic in the supporting industrial branches—we have a 38 percent reduction with the non-ferrous metallurgy, 18.5 percent with the chemical industry, 10.3 percent with the textiles, the metal and electro industry 7.4 percent, the production of machines and apparatus 22.8 percent, tobacco 11 percent, etc.

On the other hand, the overall imports in the first six months of this year have increased entire 25 percent and the import of consumer goods has grown over 90 percent alone. That, in return, unavoidably resulted with a trade deficit, which is four times greater than what the government envisaged for the same period, namely, $44 million.

The deficit in the exchange with Austria has gone up 329 percent, with Holland 834 percent, the foreign trade surplus of $1.1 million with Switzerland has been turned into a $2.5 million deficit. The $6 million surplus with Turkey has been turned into a $9.6 million deficit. The $6 million surplus with Croatia has become a $8.4 million deficit, while the surplus with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of $18 million is now a deficit of over $30 million.

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On the other hand, the surplus with Germany of $11.5 million has gone up to $73.4 million with Russia, the deficit of $12 million has turned into surplus, while the deficit in he exchange with Bulgaria of $33.5 million has gone into a $11.2 million surplus. Nevertheless, the trends with these countries, according to the Macedonian Chamber of Commerce, which has supplies this information, are not owed to objectively increased exports, but to the rapid drop in imports from these countries, so there are no possibilities of creating a deficit.

Poll: Majority Opposes Change of State's Name

AU2811190294 Skopje MIC in English 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Macedonian public believes that the dispute with Greece can be solved, but by changing the name of the state. Somewhat more than half would not have anything against changing the Constitution and flag. This attitude of the Macedonian public is derived from the cross analysis of the data obtained from the public opinion poll conducted by the agency DATA PRESS within NOVA MAKEDONIJA.

Specifically 74.33 percent of 600 people are against the changing of the name Macedonia by adding the attributes New, Upper, Vardar, Central, Slav, or against the present FYROM [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia]. Exactly 72 percent believe, however, that the dispute with Greece can be resolved, while 48.87 percent do not accept the changing of the flag and Constitution. The same number are refusing to change the name, but believe that the problem with Greece can be settled. Even 93 percent feel that the negotiations with Greece should continue.

At the same time, 19.33 percent believe that the Constitution and flag can be changed, 14.33 percent believe that the flag should be changed, and some 7 percent (6.67 percent) would accept a correction of the Constitution. If the number of undecided 11 percent is added to this number, it turns out that somewhat more than 51 percent would not have anything against a change of the Constitution and the flag, in settling the problem with Greece.

Albanians' Plans for Own University Viewed

AU2911111094 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 26 Nov 94 p 13

[Commentary by Biljana Jovanovska, Panta Djambazoski: "'University Is Not a Joke'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] An initiative for opening a university in the Albanian language in Tetovo has been started by a group of Albanian intellectuals. It has become a primary question that will overload the political scene in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] in the coming months. An additional reason for this is because all the political figures of the Albanians in Macedonia publicly support this request. The president of the largest party of Albanians—the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity]—Abdurahman Aliti has also signed the initiative that was handed to the Macedonian Government a month ago, and thus this problem acquires special political importance. The NDP [People's Democratic Party], the informal group of Taci and Djaferi, and the Albanian Democratic Alliance-Liberal Party have also supported the initiative, while we can say that the fact that the Union of Albanian Intellectuals has not yet come out with its assessment about this matter means that they support the idea. The Albanian state news agency ATA has also demonstrated an interest for the initiative and it has announced the opening of this university for the next school year.

The Macedonian Government has not yet answered the request of the so-called provisional presidency of the university, which is planning to open seven faculties "at first"—of philology, philosophy, natural sciences and mathematics, economy, law, arts, and Islamic studies, with a total of 13 specializations. In order to facilitate the acceptance of the idea by the state bodies, they have also announced to open a department of Macedonian studies, if there is interest for that, of course. It has also been underlined that they will be ready to conduct classes bilingually—which is something that does not function at all, at least not in the schools in Albanian—as well as to organize studies of Macedonian national history and Macedonian language in all faculties. According to Dr. Fadil Sulejmani, president of the board, the teachers and economic conditions do not represent a problem. The board mentions 200 masters and doctors of science that are citizens of Macedonia, but they do not say that the majority of them are either retired or expelled professors from Pristina University. The initiators of the "human idea" are optimistic in their belief that the government will show an understanding for, as they say, the natural right of the Albanians to study in their mother language and that the desired university will be in the framework of the Macedonian educational system. In case this does not happen, the possible consequences will be on the government. For them the opening of a university in Tetovo is not a problem at all. The Albanians "do not wish to endure any more the half century of educational darkness that was imposed on them by the Macedonians." As they say, they are prepared to go to the very end.

International Support!

Do the parties of the Albanians also think that there is no more time and that it is necessary to go to the very end? The question is really interesting because the positions of the Albanians in the new parliament and government will not be the same as before.

The leader of the PDP Abdurahman Aliti gave a very reduced statement on the attitude of the party in which he said: "It has to do with an elaboration on the need for opening a university that has been presented to the

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responsible bodies of the Republic of Macedonia. The PDP believes that it is a good idea that has to be pushed."

Secretary of the NDP Bedredin Ibraimi, in charge of this initiative in his party, says that his party's stance is to have it all within the framework of the institutions of the state. This means that the state should finance the university, while the curricula should be the same as that of "Saint Cyril and Methodius University," with some necessary changes. Ibraimi stressed that there are not yet professors for all subjects, but he said that this number could be completed with professors from Skopje and Bitola Universities, as well as with professors from Kosovo and Albania. Ibraimi believes that the international community will support the initiative, and if the Macedonian Government does not give its support, the university will start work in 1995. That will not be good for the state, because, as he points out, we can find ourselves in a situation similar to Kosovo regarding the sphere of education.

Menduh Taci, deputy president of the "informal group," thinks that the university must be within the framework of the institutions of the system, because it has to do with a project that is not a small one, in other words "the university is not a joke." It would have been better if the authority had not made tactics with the VMRO [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization] affiliates and if it had opened groups in Albanian at Skopje University. However, Taci emphasizes, the time for that has passed and nobody will be able to prevent the opening of Tetovo University. The Albanians do not want a war, and the Macedonians do not want it either, because if a clash occurs in Macedonia, it can grow into a Serbian-Albanian war within 24 hours, and that would be fatal for Macedonia. Regardless of any such calculations, Taci concluded, the Albanians must no longer be put in the margins. The opening of the university will be in favor of "both sides" and the students will no longer go to Tirana to study.

Without an Official Status

The international community, whose alleged support the Albanian intellectuals are relying so much on regarding the opening of a university in Tetovo, has not replied so far, except for Norman Anderson, the head of the CSCE mission in Macedonia. For him, for instance, it is much more realistic to open groups for the nationalities at the existing Academy of Pedagogy in Skopje than to open an independent university, but for now the appetite of the members of the Initiative Board is much greater than that. They cannot expect greater support than this because the country that Mr. Anderson comes from, the United States, has long ago regulated the international acts for education of minorities. The question of the education of minorities in a country has been solved in the world with international conventions that are very definite. In the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights that was adopted by the General Assembly within the frameworks of Resolution 217 A(III) on 10 December 1948 and the Convention on the Struggle Against Discrimination in the Area of Education that the same Assembly adopted on 14 December 1960 (it has been in force since May 1962) it is clearly stated that the responsible bodies of a country are committed not to prevent the representatives of national minorities to know their culture and mother language, under the conditions that it is not against the vital interests of the state. In other words, it means that representatives of minorities can establish their own schools, but without an official status, because "attendance of such schools is of a faculty type" (Article 5 of the Convention). According to this, the Republic of Macedonia is not obliged to create a parallel educational system and to give any concessions on this plan. On the contrary, it would mean a profound violation of the international acts.

If a university is opened in Tetovo, outside the system of the state, the initiators should know that their duty is to warn the future students about these international acts, so that they may immediately know that their diplomas would not be valid. Actually, there are universities of this kind also in the United States, but their students are informed before enrolling that the education that they will get there is only for their personal use. Parallel educational systems and diplomas are simply unacceptable.

However, everything is possible for the initiators. Dr. Fadil Sulejmani announces that they will not turn back. As he stated, he will ask for a discussion with President Kiro Gligorov, but that will be a "discussion without tolerance," and the last word will be Sulejmani's.

Such statements are an additional confirmation that the radical forces among the Albanians in Macedonia are rising, and their force should not be underestimated, because the political parties of the Albanians are also involved. In conditions of a rising radicalism throughout the Balkans, the "Tetovo Initiative" comes at a time when it is possible to expect a dramatic resolution in Bosnia, after which there comes the sore point of Kosovo, at least according to what some foreign prognosis say. The parties of the Albanians are apparently shifting to this direction—and this trend started with last year's division in the PDP. The portents of the division, that is the Taci affiliates, have long ago announced that it is indispensable to reach a "historical agreement" between the Macedonians and the Albanians, including the opening of a university. On the contrary, as it was announced, they will start creating independent institutions. By giving support to the initiative, the PDP is dissociating itself from its previous stance on integration of the Albanians into Macedonian society and it is once again going back to its positions of four years ago. Here comes also the question of reviving the so-called referendum on political and territorial independence of the Albanians in Macedonia of 1991, which was politically supported by the PDP as "an expressed will of the Albanians."

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Whether we are going to witness a process of integration or disintegration in Macedonia will now depend on how much the Albanians will be ready to make their requests real.

Opening Scheduled

AU2911111494 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 28 Nov 94 p 4

[MAKPRESS transmits Tirana Television news: "'Albanian University' Starts on 17 December"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana, 28 November (MAKPRESS)—The Albanian-language university in Tetovo will start work on 17 December. This was reported in the news broadcast by Tirana Television on the 25 November evening central news, as MAKPRESS reported.

According to the report of its correspondent in Skopje, the meeting in Tetovo was attended by members of the Initiative Board and representatives of political parties of Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] Albanians and Albanian intellectuals, the television report stated that the opening of the university will be attended by representatives of foreign diplomatic missions in Macedonia.

The university, whose opening is supported by the "Albanian people," will be financed by humanitarian associations and organizations, as well as by individual donors. This is what Tirana Television reported without stating precisely who these donors are and from where they come.

Organization's Response

AU2911111694 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 28 Nov 94 p 4

[Unattributed report: "'The University' as a Precursor of 'Ilirida'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The presidency of the Association of Ethnologists in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] is strongly against the initiative and illegitimate decisions for the formation of a university in the Albanian language in Tetovo. The association's assessment is that this is a tactic with the aim of legalizing Kosovization of Western Macedonia, particularly the region of Polog and Tetovo, for the revival of the so-called "Ilirida," that is the phantom "Kosovo Republic" on parts of Macedonian ethnic territory. This was stated in the statement of the association's presidency.

This initiative has nothing in common with the alleged wishes for education of the Albanian nationality, because we have two universities with all faculties that are among the best, attended by a great number of students from a number of states in Europe, Asia, and Africa who do not find the Macedonian language an obstacle to their education.

The association assessed that in the strategic determinations of the Albanian nationalists and separatists, perfidiously camouflaged with pluralism and democracy, Macedonian education is one of the main areas of their anticonstitutional activities. The Ministry of Education and the Government of Macedonia are making inappropriate tactics and by keeping quiet they have let this problem escalate, instead of reacting to this essential question of a political and security character for the Macedonian state two months ago when this initiative was not gaining ground and was not publicized in the Macedonian public. Although the Macedonian Government knew all about this, it did not react.

The Association of Ethnologists is sorry to conclude that the animosity of the members of the Albanian nationality is rising against the Macedonian people and language, that homogenization is occurring not only on an ethnic but also on a religious and Muslim base by involving other nations, too, calling for open separatism and involving the country in disorder.

The association is also incapable of understanding the Macedonian Government that has allowed for two years the Albanian-language mass media, which are financed by the Macedonian Government, to speak and write daily about the "Kosovo Republic" as a fait accompli knowing the political implications.

Drug Route to Europe Runs Across FYROM

LD2811165394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1548 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, Nov. 28 (TANJUG)—The drug-smuggling channel known as the Balkan Road has introduced an increasingly attractive side-road across The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] to avoid the strict control at Yugoslav border crossings.

The roughly 20,000 smugglers who daily cross the FYROM-Bulgaria border as a rule include drug smugglers. The police recently arrested a group of drug smugglers in the town of Debar on FYROM's border with Albania and seized two kilograms of heroin coming from Istanbul.

The police and medical institutions have been warning of the 'disturbing rise' in the number of drug addicts in FYROM.

The number of drug addicts used to be negligible although the former Yugoslav Republic was considered a "risk" region because of poppy growing.

Police and medical experts say there is a growing number of ethnic Albanians among drug addicts in FYROM.

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The tale among the young people in the FYROM capital of Skopje and the towns of Kumanovo and Tetovo is that the best way to obtain drugs is through members of the United Nations Protection Force.

Local drug dealers, mostly ethnic Albanians, have a well developed and smooth-running network in FYROM.

There are 1,368 United Nations peacekeepers in FYROM, of whom 509 are from the United States and the remainder from Nordic countries.

London newspapers recently reported that ethnic Albanians from the former Yugoslavia control as much as 70 percent of the illicit heroin market in Switzerland.

The illicit drug market in Germany is controlled by ethnic Albanians and Turks.

French experts had said back in 1991 that the war in the former Yugoslavia was heavily financed with money from the illicit drug trade in Western Europe. French experts now warn that the ethnic-Albanian narco-mafia uses profits to purchase weapons for 'ethnic uprisings' in Kosovo and Metohija, the southern province in the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia, and FYROM.

A strong ethnic-Albanian separatist movement has been active in Kosovo and Metohija for years, wanting the province to break away from Serbia and Yugoslavia and join neighboring Albania.

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Prime Minister Discusses Italy, EU Membership

AU2811125194 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 0600 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek said in an interview for Radio Krka in Novo Mesto yesterday that—if Slovenia fails to secure a consensus about negotiations on associate membership in Brussels today, that is, if Italy blocks this consensus—he intends to further escalate the problem by making more international appearances. The prime minister is also willing to state that the negotiations, that is, the talks with Italy, no longer interest us in the short term, that we will not allow ourselves to be blackmailed, and that we will no longer tolerate a game in which they are passing us on every month from one ministerial council meeting to another, exerting pressure on us in between, trying to make us yield by the next meeting and, thus, get a go ahead sign. Our reply to this will be that we no longer accept this game and that we also will give up the European Union associate membership for some time, if need be, and especially any talks of this kind with Italy, Dr. Drnovsek emphasized.

He again reiterated that agreements between Italy and Slovenia are signed and valid and that Italy has no grounds for additional demands. Slovenia meets all the criteria for EU associate membership. However, Italy is posing additional conditions that are unfounded because other states did not have to meet them either. Drnovsek believes that similar demands could arise elsewhere if Italy were to succeed with its demands toward Slovenia. [passage omitted]

Peterle on Agreement With Italy, Drnovsek

AU2811145794 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 26 Nov 94 p 7

["R.O."-signed report: "Those Who Made Us Sick Yesterday Are Not Today's Doctors"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vienna, 25 November—Lojze Peterle, chairman of the Slovene Christian Democrats, sees himself confronted with vituperative attacks in Slovenia. When he briefed parliament in Ljubljana on his talks with the Italian Foreign Minister Martino, he was shouted down and the parliamentarians chanted: "We will not agree to a revision of Osimo." However, the agreement of Aquilea and its specification later in Rome was based on the treaty concluded in 1975.

In an interview with FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, the departing foreign minister explained that both his Italian counterpart and he assured each other from the beginning that they will not ignore the unfortunate past, but that they want to shape relations in a future-oriented way. Thus, they immediately agreed to settle the controversial issues that exist between the two states in a "European spirit." The goal of the agreement concluded with Martino is to bring Slovenia gradually closer to the European Union [EU] and the Western European Union, as well as to NATO.

Why was there no "declaration by the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Italy and the chairman of the government of the Republic of Slovenia" that Martino and Peterle wanted to draft, in spite of the constructive spirit of Aquilea? Forces interested in restoring the past undermined their efforts, Peterle stressed. Yet he "convinced" Gianfranco Fini, the leader of the "National Alliance," so that, "after one of his worst nights," the latter had to explain a few things to his supporters and to finally accept the agreement.

However, the real resistance came from Ljubljana. The cabinet and parliament—with the exception of his own party—rejected the result of the negotiations. The critics were not really interested in the contents of the agreement because of which they accused him publicly of "Slovenia's sellout." Without knowing anything about the contents, they attacked him. "I was not even at home when the media wrote: 'Peterle has not achieved anything.'" The facts belie that. In fact, Martino and he reached an "agreement of historical reciprocity," of mutual give and take while fully observing the existing treaties, including the agreement of Osimo.

In the draft of the declaration, initialed by the two foreign ministers, it was agreed to strengthen the rights of the ethnic minorities. Rome promised the restoration of the Slovene cultural center in Trieste and agreed to finance private Slovene schools in the northeastern parts of Italy where Slovenes are living. In addition, the Slovenes living in the province of Udine, who have been ignored by the Italians so far, are to be granted the same rights as those living in Venezia-Giulia and Trieste. According to the draft of the declaration, Slovenia wants to adapt its constitutional regulations concerning the acquisition of property by foreigners to the European laws.

This would mean that it would be possible for Italians who were expelled and for their offspring to repurchase former property—the draft does not mention the return of property—if it is owned by the Slovene state. Thus, Slovene citizens who own former Italian property would not be affected by this regulation. According to Peterle, a total of 200 homes, including buildings in three communes, and not "several thousand" houses and land, as claimed by his opponents, are involved.

Thus, the rejection by the cabinet and parliament is only superficially directed against the agreement, the outgoing foreign minister stressed. The real reason for the refusal was "my personal success." This is an old tradition in Ljubljana. Politicians have been envious of their future-oriented policy since the republic became independent in 1991. He experienced this during his term of office as first prime minister of the free Slovenia, during which he achieved the country's international recognition, created a solid economic basis, gave the country a stable and freely convertible currency, the tolar, reduced

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the interest and inflation rate, and succeeded in keeping unemployment low in spite of the tremendous transformation process. The first government finally failed because of the "resistance of the old forces," who call themselves "reform communists," but who still largely cling to dialectic thinking and who have kept their old positions.

The former communists in particular found it difficult to accept the relatively good showing of his Christian Democrats in the first free elections. Thus, they undermined the government alliance Demos until it finally collapsed. The only party that is not burdened by the past is the Christian Democrats. All other parties and groups, including the Greens that have been incorporated into the Liberal Democratic Party, "were founded and even planned" by the Central Committee of the Slovene Communists in the course of the collapse of the old Yugoslavia. The Slovene party organization of the "League of Communists of Yugoslavia" "dissolved into various parties" at the time.

For this reason, the old dependencies and links continue to exist. So-called "chastened communists" have turned into liberal democrats, social democrats, and members of the National Party. High offices are held by former communists: The president's office, the office of the head of government, the office of the parliamentary president and of his deputy, the office of the State Council president (second chamber of parliament), leading positions in the Slovene media, and finally it was not possible to purge the judicial organs, the army, the police, schools, and universities because of a lack of suitable personnel. The only persons to whom this statement does not apply are the head of the central bank and the archbishop of Ljubljana, Peterle added, smiling. "Those who made us sick yesterday are certainly not today's doctors."

Peterle explicitly included President Kucan in this statement. In fact, Peterle has a "correct relationship" with the head of state. He primarily respects Kucan because of his achievements during the changes. As party leader, he ensured that the secret service, the militia, and the army—which were controlled by one person—did not crush the pro-democracy and the independence movement. Still, Kucan remained what he was as far as his education, nature, and the use of power—"even though limited by the constitution"—are concerned.

Peterle, who has been reduced to the position of chairman and foreign-policy spokesman of the Christian Democrats, who are still part of the Drnovsek government (15 members of parliament, three ministers) after his resignation last month, forced by circumstances, accuses the prime minister in particular of "playing with power and politics." Drnovsek has announced that he wants to stick to his tough position in the quarrel with Italy and that he wants to hold new negotiations—even with Prime Minister Berlusconi personally—knowing how fragile and unstable Italy's internal situation is, and that neither he, Drnovsek, nor the Italian government will be able to afford a less far-reaching result than the one he achieved without embarrassment. Assertions by Drnovsek that he has won partners abroad for his idea and friends for Slovenia's cause, and that it is to be expected that the negotiating mandate for an association agreement with the European Union will be granted at the EU Council meeting in Brussels on 28 November are a farce. In fact, the British EU commissioner Brittan has stated: "You have the right and we have the problem."

For this reason, Slovenia will remain outside the European home until its relationship with Italy is clarified. Peterle is convinced that Drnovsek is now playing the strong man and acting as the "guarantor of Slovene interests" because local elections will be taking place in the entire country in December. After that, the prime minister—"flexible as always"—will sign an agreement with Italy whose result may be worse but which he can describe as his own success.

Former Foreign Minister Peterle depicted the situation in the Balkans in sinister colors. He expressed the hope that his fears might be wrong; that a "real war" might break out between Serbia and its direct neighbors. He mentioned Bosnia-Herzegovina, the "suppression in Kosovo," the ongoing tensions between Serbia and Croatia, and the "Serbian conflict with Macedonia, in which the EU and NATO member Greece is also involved." Peterle believes that it will take 10 years for the situation in states that have formed after Yugoslavia's collapse to normalize—"if the tensions and conflicts can be eliminated at all," he added restrictively.

Meeting Improves Slovene-Croatian Relations

AU2811180594 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] After the unofficial September meeting between Lojze Peterle, our foreign minister at the time, and Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic, today's meeting between the presidents of both economic parliamentary commissions was the first attempt to warm up nearly frozen bilateral relations.

Representatives of both parliaments, Horvat and Degoricija, thus, broke with the practice of the past few months whereby Ljubljana and Zagreb have maintained contact only through diplomatic protest notes.

After morning talks, Feri Horvat said to Radio Slovenia:

[Begin Horvat recording] The president of the economic commission of the Croatian Sabor showed great interest in parliaments providing an impulse for speedier resolution of open issues. The most important is a conclusion that because of the problems that exist and the resolution of which will take some time, we do not need to wait with issues that could be resolved more easily, and there are plenty of such issues. Our joint conclusion was, therefore, that we should draft and sign a free trade agreement as quickly as possible. This is required for the sake of

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bilateral cooperation and also to link Slovenia and Croatia with the European Union. This is needed for GATT, a member of which Slovenia already is and with whom Croatia is about to negotiate. Of course, if we do not mutually sort these matters out we will encounter them again at the international level, and we will definitely both have problems because of it. [end recording]

'Trial' Election Shows Number of Undecided Voters

AU2911112794 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 26 Nov 94 pp 1,4

[FBIS Editorial Report] Ljubljana DELO in Slovene on 26 November on pages 1 and 4 carries the results of its trial local elections held in 20 municipalities between 21 and 23 November prior to the 4 December local elections. As the paper says, the researchers tried to invite people who corresponded to the actual structure of voters in any particular municipality in terms of sex, age, and other characteristics. The number of invitations sent out was proportionate to the number of voters in a given municipality and ranged from 1,300 in Ljubljana and 800 in Maribor to 400 invitations in smaller towns and rural municipalities.

The results differed from municipality to municipality, however, the article points out the prevailing relatively high percentage of undecided voters and voters who do not intend to vote at all, which makes the paper conclude that "it would not pay to place any serious bets on winners of the forthcoming December elections." The results of the poll in larger Slovene towns were as follows:

In Ljubljana, the turnout at the trial elections was the lowest—only 53.6 percent—and 32.8 percent did not vote for a single list of candidates for the city council. Among those who did, 17.7 percent voted for the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS), 17.2 percent for the Social Democratic Party of Slovenia (SDSS), 15.7 percent for the Slovene Christian Democrats (SKD), and 15.3 for the United List of Social Democrats (ZLSD). The favorite among the candidates for Ljubljana mayor was Dr. France Bucar with 31.5 percent of the votes.

The turnout in the second largest Slovene town, Maribor, was 75.2 percent, and 38.5 percent of the trial voters were undecided. The LDS led with 20 percent of votes, followed by the ZLSD with 14.7 percent, the Democratic Party of Retirees (11.2 percent), and the Slovene Peoples' Party (SLS) with 9.6 percent of the votes.

The turnout in Celje was 73.8 percent, and 32.4 percent of voters were undecided. The leading party in the town was the SDSS (17.4 percent), followed by the Democratic Party of Retirees (16.9 percent), the SKD (16.4 percent), the LDS (15.5 percent), and the SLS (10.6 percent).

The turnout in Kranj was high, 82.3 percent; however, so was the percentage of undecided voters, 45.4 percent. The leading party in the town was the SDSS (18.8 percent), followed by the LDS (16.9 percent), the SKD (15 percent), and the ZLSD (14 percent).

The trail elections in Nova Gorica showed an unusually low percentage of undecided voters, only 8.3 percent, coupled with a good turnout of 77.2 percent. The leading party in Nova Gorica is the Alliance for Primorska (20 percent), followed by the LDS with 18.4 percent, the SKD with 17.8 percent, and the ZLSD with 15 percent.

The same decisiveness was noted in another town in western Slovenia, in Koper, where 14 percent of voters were undecided. With 36.2 percent of the votes, the ZLSD is convincingly the leading party in town, followed by the LDS with 17.3 percent, the Democratic Party of Retirees (12.2 percent), and the SKD (6.4 percent).

The turnout in Novo Mesto was 76.1 percent, and 26.3 percent of voters were undecided. First came the SKD (17.5 percent), followed by the LDS (16.9 percent), the SLS (12.9 percent), the SDSS (10.6 percent), and the ZLSD (10.3 percent).

The turnout in the remaining 13 municipalities was generally good, ranging from 68.1 percent to 84.3 percent, however, most municipalities also had a considerable percentage of undecided voters. Their number was the highest in Vojnik, where 50.7 percent were undecided in the elections for the city council, and also in Ptuj (41.1 percent), Zelezniki (40.7 percent), and Ravne (38.9 percent). The leading party in most municipalities was the LDS (6), followed by the SKD (4), the SDSS (2), and the ZLSD (1).

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Serbia

Milosevic in Peace Talks With Contact Group

LD2811185994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1831 GMT 28 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 28 Nov (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic has received Contact Group representatives who arrived in Belgrade this afternoon.

Talks between President Milosevic and representatives from Russia, the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany, who make up the international Contact Group, focused on topics connected with the reaffirmation of the peace process and halting the escalation of the war on the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbian president's office says in a statement issued this evening.

It was concluded that the initiative for general cessation of hostilities on the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was put forward in the Milosevic-Kozyrev talks yesterday, ought to be put into practice and conditions thus be created for halting the war in this area and for beginning work on the conclusion of the peace process based on the peace plan, the statement says.

It was also said that in the future armed provocations aimed at prolonging the war and resorting to military means of solving the crisis in this area by the international community, i.e. NATO, ought to be prevented.

It was underlined that the Contact Group ought to develop elements of its peace plan, which primarily refers to the constitutional set-up and bilateral negotiations on the final territorial settlement, and set out its obligations regarding the lifting of the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the statement says.

The talks were also attended by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic and Presidential Office Head Goran Milinovic.

Kosovo

Human Rights Group Reports More Serbian Violence

AU2811133294 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT No 496 in English 25 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Prishtina-based Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) issued today report covering the last two week's Serbian police human rights abuses in Kosova.

The Serbian regime brutality has outlandishly escalated in Kosova over the past days, says the report. The Council has been provided on a daily basis with vast evidence of drastic human rights violence throughout. During the last week alone, some 343 cases of human rights abuses were evidenced. Some 301 Albanians were ill-treated in various fashions, 72 persons were arbitrarily arrested, 39 others suffered beatings and torture, and 61 Albanians had their households raided on by the Serbian police. Political parties, trade unions and educational activists have particularly been targeted by the Serbian regime. At least 23 members of the Independent Trade-Unions of former police employees of Kosova have been arrested over the last couple of days. Dozens of LDK [Democratic League of Kosovo] leaders and activists have been arrested and brutalized in many centers in Kosova, including almost all member of the LDK Presidency in Suhareka who have been extended detention to additional 30 days and are expected to be tried. Since January this year alone, at least 87 Albanians have been tried and sentenced for their political beliefs, whereas proceedings have been instituted against 30 other, and the number is ever increasing.

The Serbian regime has been ceaselessly undertaking drives of harassing, intimidating, brutalizing and provoking Albanians through various methods including demonstration of force and at the same time calling for further colonization of Kosova, says the report, calling on international community to exert pressure on Serbian regime to halt the violence against the innocent Albanian people of Kosova.

Parties Condemn Serb Violence

AU2811170194 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT No 496 in English 25 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Albanian political parties, institutions and associations in Kosova have been denouncing escalation of the Serbian regime violence in Kosova in the recent days.

The Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosova, in a statement issued yesterday that the recent Serbian drives aim at further provoking the Albanian people and igniting a conflict in Kosova. The Government of the self-styled Yugoslavia in a meeting held November 15 1994, empowered decisions in favor of ethnic cleansing by preventing the repatriation of persons who have been sheltered in western countries. This decision and a great number of similar ones promulgated earlier, alongside with the drives to colonize Kosova, prove to the fact that this regime is committed to complete its schemes for ethnic cleansing of Kosova and changing its ethnic composition, says the statement.

The Liberal Party of Kosova also condemned, in a statement issued yesterday, the recent moves of the Serbian regime in Kosova. "The aim of the stepped up violence in Kosova is to minimize the prospects for an Albanian-Serbian dialogue and to employ the only language the Serbian regime is capable of, that is the language of force, intimidation, and violence", says the statement.

In a statement issued yesterday the Parliamentarian Party of Kosova says that the escalation of the Serbian

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regime violence over the past day against political and trade union activists are nothing but a continuation of the policies exercised for a very long time now in Kosova.

Such oppressive drives have been employed at a time various sources and media have been announcing the possibility for setting up of an Albanian-Serb dialogue. The Serbian regime is intent on minimizing the possibilities for a genuine and dialogue, and imposing a reality Serbia has created through force in Kosova, the statement says.

LDK Official Comments

AU2811170294 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT No 496 in English 25 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The last week has been characterized by an increase of the already heavy Serbian repression against the unprotected Albanian people, said Hidajet Hyseni, LDK [Democratic League of Kosovo] vice-chairman, speaking to reporters in a press conference in Prishtina today. He said the Albanian political, humanitarian and trade-unions activists have been made the focus of this stepped up Serbian crackdown. Hidajet Hyseni assessed as very successful the recent trip of President Rugova of the republic of Kosova to some European countries, and his top-level meetings with co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference on the former Yugoslavia, the Dutch foreign minister, the chairman of the Belgian Senate and of the CSCE Assembly, and the Swiss foreign minister, Flavio Cotti. LDK vice-chairman said a Kosova parliamentary delegation had important meetings in Canada in last week.

Hidajet Hyseni hailed UN Special Rapporteur Tadeusz Mazoviecki's statements about the recent developments in Kosova.

LDK senior official said any genuine initiative for the peaceful settlement of the Kosova question are welcome. He said the Serbian side has not shown a willingness for an just and long- term peaceful solution to the Kosova question. "The drastic increase in the wide- scale repression at a time when dialogue and a peaceful solution are mooted shows that the statements of the Serbian leadership uttered now and then on their alleged commitment to peace and dialogue are a bluff and political maneuvers," said Mr. Hyseni.

LDK vice-chairmen quoted reports of wide-scale human rights abuses in Kosova. "343 instances of human rights abuses have been reported this week in Kosova; 301 persons have been maltreated in diverse manners; 72 persons have been arrested; 61 households have been raided on; 39 cases of physical tortures have been reported; 199 persons have been maltreated on arms searches pretexts", said Hyseni. He went on to say that there were 30 cases of maltreatment of political activists, and 27 of educational ones.

LDK vice-chairman told reporters that the scope of the Serbian repression is ubiquitous, adding that trade-unions activists of the former Kosova police employees were especially targeted over the past week. "As many as 40 people have been arrested, including trade-unions leaders", said Mr. Hyseni, adding that there are reports of tortures of these people while in detention. "Some of them are in a critical condition", he said, quoting as an example Ramadan Ndrecaj's case. Besides proceeding deficiencies in the case of these arrests, Mr. Hyseni quoted cases of family members being taken hostage by the Serbian police.

LDK vice-chairman said the Serbian regime has been doing everything towards the fulfillment of its ultimate goal of a genocidal ethnic cleansing of Kosova. This is made evident from the fact that Serbian military exercises, the re-emergence of the so- called 'Serbian resistance movement', and announcement by the Serbian authorities of their resolve to obstruct the repatriation of the Albanian asylum-seekers, coincide.

LDK Vice-Chairman Hidajet Hyseni called on the international community to pressurize the Serbian leadership so as to bring an end to the latest wave of violence and terror against the Albanians in Kosova.

Collusion With Belgrade Seen

AU2811170094 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT No 496 in English 25 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "The stepping up of organized state violence against the Albanians, which has assumed tragic dimensions these days, denotes that there is a clear indication of the collusion of the Serbian political circles in Kosova with the political and state authorities in Belgrade", says today's BUJKU newspaper in a leading article. This violence has exacerbated immediately in the aftermath of trips to Kosova of high-ranking Serbian officials, Dragan Tomic (Serbian Assembly chairman), Vekoslav Sosevic (minister), General Perisic (chief of staff), police chief Jokanovic, Serbian Refugee Commissioner, says BUJKU, concluding that they might have given instructions on the modes of this violence against Albanians, including women and children.

The Albanian-language newspaper BUJKU says it is the Serbian side which has been staving off possibility of good neighborly relations between the Albanians and the Serbs. The state violence against individuals and their families will gravely affect the prospects for promotion of such relations, BUJKU ends.

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